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RULES OF ORIGIN : NAFTA’S HEART, 
BUT FTAA’S HEARTBURN 
Jorge Alberto Ramírez∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
he North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) 
went into effect on January 1, 1994.1  Yet, nine years after 
its passage, questions remain about its impact on the economies 
and environment of the United States (“U.S.”), Canada and 
Mexico.2  Although economists can make certain assumptions 
  
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law and Director, International Programs, 
Texas Tech University School of Law; A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Harvard 
University.  The author would like to thank Professor Victoria V. Sutton, Pro-
fessor William R. Casto and Professor Robert E. Lutz II for their valuable 
comments provided on an earlier draft, and Texas Tech Law Librarian 
Stephen Good for invaluable research assistance. 
 1. David M. Gilmore, Free Trade Area of the Americas: Is It Desirable?, 31 
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 383, 386 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 
 2. Altieri explains that 
[m]easuring the total benefit from eight years of NAFTA is not easy.  
In the United States, the [United States Trade Representative, 
known as the] USTR suggests that NAFTA has increased household 
income by $1,300 to $2,000 annually, and that since NAFTA was 
signed, U.S. manufacturing has added over 400,000 jobs.  Nonethe-
less, the USTR has failed to provide documentation pursuant to a 
Freedom of Information Act request for substantiation of the USTR 
figure.  Public Citizen estimates NAFTA has caused the loss of 1.7 
million U.S. manufacturing jobs and a surging $450 billion U.S. trade 
deficit.  Global Exchange says more than 765,000 U.S. jobs have dis-
appeared as a result of NAFTA.  When these laid off workers find 
new jobs, they earn 23 percent less on average than at their previous 
employment.  In Mexico, manufacturing wages fell 21 percent from 
1995 to 1999, and have only started to recover.  The percentage of 
Mexicans living in poverty has also grown since NAFTA went into ef-
fect. 
Laura Altieri, Between Empire and Community: The United States and Multi-
lateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment: Trade and Economic Affairs: 
NAFTA and the FTAA: Regional Alternatives to Multilateralism, 21 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 847, 875–76 (2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omit-
ted).  Additionally, Michael C. McClintock notes that 
while U.S. companies have benefited from free trade, most workers 
feel left out in sharing those gains,…workers’ wages for the past sev-
eral years have remained stagnant and many…of the new jobs cre-
 
T
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based on NAFTA’s short-term results, it is not yet fully imple-
mented in many respects.3  Despite this fact, the thirty-four 
countries of the Western Hemisphere (“Partner Nations”) con-
tinue to pursue a Free Trade Area of the Americas (“FTAA”), 
which would be a free trade area like NAFTA, but which would 
extend beyond Mexico to encompass all of Central and South 
America.4  The decision to extend North America’s blanket of 
free trade beyond Mexico’s southern border solidified only 
eleven months after NAFTA’s implementation.5  Discussion of 
an FTAA began at the First Summit of the Americas held in 
  
ated do not provide health care or retirement benefits.  Average real 
wages for those participating in the New Economy have risen 11% 
since 1994, while real wages in the rest of the economy rose only 3%. 
Michael C. McClintock, Sunrise Mexico; Sunset NAFTA-Centric FTAA–What 
Next and Why?, 7 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 1, 77 (2000) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, Gilmore states that while 
[i]t is obvious from the increases in Mexican trade they have received 
a substantial benefit from NAFTA, it is difficult to quantify what 
benefits NAFTA has bestowed on the United States based on the sta-
tistics.  While it is true that exports to Mexico have increased sub-
stantially, since they are now the third largest trading partner of the 
United States, they only account for a small share of total U.S. ex-
ports. 
Gilmore, supra note 1, at 395.  “NAFTA has created job gains and losses, but 
genuine disagreement exists as to whether NAFTA has created or lost more 
jobs.”  McClintock, supra note 2, at 24. 
 3. Transition periods for tariff reductions will continue to run until Janu-
ary 2008 for certain sensitive products.  North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, Dec. 8–17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289, Annex 
302.2 [hereinafter NAFTA].  In addition, emergency relief in the form of sus-
pension of tariff reductions called for by NAFTA may be invoked under Chap-
ter 8 of NAFTA until that time.  Finally, obstacles to trade in service indus-
tries such as trucking have not been fully implemented and have recently 
been hampered by at least one decision in the U.S. Federal Courts.  See Public 
Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
the Department of Transportation’s promulgation of three regulations without 
prior environmental analysis violated the Clean Air Act and state law but 
fulfilled the NAFTA obligations.  The case was remanded to the Department 
for proper analysis.).  See also The American Society of International Law, 
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: 
U.S.-Mexico Dispute on Cross-border Trucking, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 194 
(Sean D. Murphy ed., 2003) (providing a brief overview of the NAFTA truck-
ing dispute and the 9th Circuit opinion dealing with it). 
 4. JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 
PROSPECTS FOR FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 1–2 (2001). 
 5. Id. at 1. 
File: RamirezMacro3.22.04.doc Created on: 3/22/2004 2:25 PM Last Printed: 4/8/2004 1:36 PM 
2004] RULES OF ORIGIN 619 
Miami in December 1994.6  At this first meeting, the thirty-four 
democracies of the Western Hemisphere7 agreed to pursue a 
free trade area that would encompass all of the Americas by 
December 2005.8  Since 1994, the Partner Nations have negoti-
ated intensely, and have resolved many potential problems.  
Still, significant problems remain.9 
As with the negotiation and implementation of NAFTA, the 
ultimate success of any FTAA will hinge on developing worka-
ble rules of origin,10 which play a critical role for any free trade 
area agreement.11  The concept of a free trade area (“FTA”) is 
  
 6. See generally id. at 1–4 (describing events that led to the Miami Sum-
mit). 
 7. Cuba, because of its Communist form of government, was the only 
country of the Western Hemisphere prohibited from participating in the Mi-
ami Summit.  Christopher M. Bruner, Hemispheric Integration and the Poli-
tics of Regionalism: The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 33 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002) (describing the “democracy clause” contained in 
a declaration issued by the thirty-four participants at the Third Summit of the 
Americas, April 20-22, 2001). 
 8. Paul A. O’Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of 
Legal Obstacles Under a NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 127, 127 
(1995). 
 9. See SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 13; Gilmore, supra note 1 (describing the 
work still needed to move FTAA negotiations forward). 
    10.  SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 87 (“A key aspect of the market access nego-
tiations will be the development of rules of origin (i.e., the criteria for 
determining eligibility for FTAA preferences).”).   
 11. THIRD BUSINESS FORUM OF THE AMERICAS, NORTH-SOUTH CENTER, 
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, POSITION PAPER: CUSTOMS PROCEDURES AND RULES OF 
ORIGIN 2 (May 1997), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/ftaa/belo/forum/ 
workshops/papers/wks3/uomcp_e.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter 
CUSTOMS PROCEDURES AND RULES OF ORIGIN]. 
Historically, governments have adopted rules of origin for a wide 
range of purposes, including qualification for duty-free treatment, 
charges against quotas, levying of dumping and countervailing du-
ties, embargoes, and labeling and marking.  As the hemisphere 
moves toward trade integration, the threshold question for all goods 
crossing borders will be, “Does this qualify as a product of a hemi-
spheric country or countries?”  Rules of origin are important to im-
porters because they will dictate illegibility for Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA) treatment.  They are also important to produc-
ers because they will dictate where businesses must produce and 
where they must source their materials and components in order to 
maximize the benefits of free trade. 
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very simple.  An FTA begins when a group of neighboring na-
tions decides that it would be more advantageous to trade 
among themselves than it would be to trade with nations in 
other parts of the world.12  Aside from the economic advantages 
associated with restricting trade to individuals living in closer 
proximity, there exists the additional benefit of helping 
neighbors to grow their own economies — neighbors who likely 
will become consumers for one’s own products.13  To encourage 
trade and its accompanying economic benefits among members 
of the FTA, the member nations agree to grant each other spe-
cial trading privileges or benefits that they deny to imports 
from non-member countries.14  Chief among these benefits are 
lower or non-existent tariffs on goods imported from member 
nations.15  However, for partner nations to implement such fa-
vorable trade benefits successfully, each must have a set of pro-
cedures which allow their customs agents to determine whether 
or not the products being imported originated in a partner na-
tion.  Without these procedures, known as the rules of origin, 
any FTA would fail because the partner nations would have no 
way to favor products from partner nations over those from non-
partner nations.  Thus, the rules of origin provide the critical 
link that makes any FTA viable. 
  
Id.  As discussed in Part III infra, the FTAA’s success will also depend on its 
rules of origin being more understandable and more user-friendly than 
NAFTA’s rules. 
 12. SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 5. 
 13. “[T]he FTAA would strengthen each country’s interest in the economic 
health and political stability of the other members.  This is important because 
problems in one country often spill over to neighbors and trading partners.”  
SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 92.  “NAFTA highlighted to US policymakers the 
great opportunities that can be created by closer trade ties with neighboring 
countries.”  Id. at 9. 
 14. Id. at 84–85. 
 15. Id. at 86. 
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NAFTA’s rules of origin are the most complex ever devised,16 
but they have helped to police NAFTA’s implementation and 
have contributed to Mexico and Canada becoming the U.S.’ 
largest trading partners.17  The thirty-four Western Hemisphere 
democracies have used NAFTA as their model in negotiating 
many provisions as they pursue an FTAA.18  Although the com-
  
 16. “Canada and Mexico had to accept the most detailed, complex and 
stringent market opening rules ever written which ideologically codified U.S. 
free trade policy in a 585 page primary document whose annexes and 
amended tariff schedules together total over 2,500 pages.”  McClintock, supra 
note 2, at 44.  “[NAFTA’s] rules of origin for this determination are notorious 
for their complexity.”  Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, 
United States-Latin American Trade Laws, 21 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
111, 141 (1995).  “[T]he NAFTA rules of origin are much more complex and 
have a higher local content requirement than either MERCOSUR or the re-
cent Chile-Canada Free Trade Agreement.”  Gilmore, supra note 1, at 411.  
“[T]he comprehensiveness of the NAFTA regime results in trade-inhibiting 
complexity.”  David A. Pawlak, International Trade in the Americas: The In-
ter-American Lawyer’s Guide to Origin Determinations, 5 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 317, 343 (1997).  “The MERCOSUR rules of origin requirements are far less 
complicated than those of the NAFTA….In sharp contrast to the very detailed 
and minute treatment given to determining the origin of products in the 
NAFTA context, MERCOSUR’s rules of origin are relatively simple and com-
paratively liberal.”  Thomas Andrew O’Keefe, Commentary, NAFTA and the 
Expansion of Free Trade: Current Issues and Future Prospects, 14 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 309 (1997).  “The rules of origin are of particular concern 
because of the complexity of demonstrating compliance, particularly where 
regional value calculations are required.”  David A. Gantz, The United States 
and the Expansion of Western Hemisphere Free Trade: Participant or Ob-
server?, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 381, 401 (1997). 
 17. McClintock states that 
Canada is the largest U.S. trading partner exchanging goods and ser-
vices worth $1 billion daily.  In 1998, the U.S. bilateral trade with 
Mexico reached $174 billion, displacing Japan as the United States’ 
second largest trading partner.  32% of the United States’ overall ex-
ports go to, and 29% of its total imports come from, Canada and Mex-
ico. 
McClintock, supra note 2, at 75.  See also U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL 
INFORMATION PROGRAMS, BACKGROUNDER: FTAA OFFERS POTENTIAL FOR SIG-
NIFICANT INCREASE IN TRADE FLOWS, at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ 
ar/summit/ftaa20.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (containing more U.S. trade 
statistics). 
 18. “[T]he NAFTA model is also widely viewed as the likely blueprint for 
the [rules of origin] of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).”  Antoni 
Estevadeordal & Kati Suominen, Paper, Rules of Origin: A World Map, (Pre-
liminary draft presented at the seminar “Regional Trade Agreements in Com-
parative Perspective: Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia-Pacific”) 
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plex rules of origin have served NAFTA well, they cannot serve 
as models for the rules of origin to be developed for the FTAA 
because the existing complexity would become exponentially 
greater, and thus, bring trade to a halt.19  Using NAFTA-like 
rules of origin would doom the FTAA even before it leaves the 
negotiating table.  Therefore, negotiators must either develop 
simpler rules or develop an alternative regional trade agree-
ment model if they are ever to establish a Hemispheric–wide 
agreement. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of international 
trade, including the history, culture and diplomatic relation-
ships among the three NAFTA partners, and provides the back-
ground and understanding (so important in international law) 
for interpreting and implementing NAFTA’s provisions.  This 
historical overview illustrates the complexities involved in ne-
gotiating trade agreements when only three nations are in-
volved, and discusses the increasing complexity when that 
number grows by a factor of ten. 
Part II focuses on the NAFTA rules of origin.  It provides spe-
cific examples that demonstrate their importance to a free trade 
area, their operation and how special interests have helped 
fashion them.  This Part also illustrates how the NAFTA rules 
of origin work, and sets the foundation for the argument that 
they cannot serve as the model for a future FTAA.  Part III 
identifies the obstacles that FTAA negotiators will face if they 
try to construct their own rules of origin.  The Article concludes 
that the success of any agreement ultimately will rest upon the 
ability of nations to put aside individual political interests and 
economic anomalies in favor of hemispheric interests and truly 
free trade. 
  
(Apr. 2003), at 11 (internal citations omitted), available at http://www.iadb. 
org/intal/foros/LAestevadeordal_&_suominen_paper.pdf.  “[D]espite the many 
drawbacks of the NAFTA regime, it likely will be adopted for use in the 
FTAA.”  Pawlak, supra note 16, at 343.  “[T]he United States favored the crea-
tion of the FTAA through NAFTA expansion on a bilateral basis, which would 
give the United States substantial negotiating leverage over other nations in 
the hemisphere.”  Bruner, supra note 7, at 39. 
 19. Bruner, supra note 7, at 39. 
File: RamirezMacro3.22.04.doc Created on: 3/22/2004 2:25 PM Last Printed: 4/8/2004 1:36 PM 
2004] RULES OF ORIGIN 623 
I. HISTORY, CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AMONG 
NAFTA’S PARTNER NATIONS 
Trade is as old as civilization itself.  The need to trade is a 
natural outgrowth of a world whose natural resources are un-
evenly distributed around the globe.20  Areas of the world 
blessed with certain natural wealth may at the same time suf-
fer from the absence of other important resources.21  Civiliza-
tions that have made certain technological advances may lack 
the requisite natural resources to take full advantage of that 
technology and vice versa.22  The theory of absolute advantage 
helps to explain why it is economically efficient for nations to 
trade with each other.23  The theory holds that a country pos-
sessing a natural advantage for producing a particular type of 
good would make the best use of its resources and time if it con-
centrates on producing that one product, and uses that product 
in trade to obtain those products for which its production proc-
esses are less efficient.24  “[W]hat if a country has no absolute 
advantage over any of its potential trading partners with re-
spect to any products or services?”25  The Nineteenth Century 
economist David Ricardo answered this question in his 1817 
book entitled “The Principles of Political Economy.”26  Ricardo 
developed the theory of comparative advantage, a revolutionary 
way of thinking about international trade, which holds that a 
country should focus its resources on producing and exporting 
those goods which it can produce most efficiently even if it does 
not have an absolute advantage over its trading partner,27 be-
  
 20. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 2–3 (2d ed. 1999). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. (describing Adam Smith’s theory of absolute advantage). 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. at 3. 
 26. Id. 
 27. As Trebilcock and Howse explain, 
[s]uppose a lawyer is not only more efficient in the provision of legal 
services than her secretary, but is also a more efficient secretary.  It 
takes her secretary twice as long to type a document as the lawyer 
could type it herself.  Suppose, more specifically, that it takes the 
lawyer’s secretary two hours to type a document that the lawyer 
could type in one hour, and that the secretary’s hourly wage is $20, 
and that the lawyer’s hourly rate to clients is $200.  It will pay the 
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cause international trade remains mutually advantageous even 
if one partner does not have an absolute advantage over an-
other.28  By a series of arithmetic examples, Ricardo demon-
strated that nations are most efficient when they specialize in 
the production and export of goods in which they have the 
greatest comparative advantage, and import those goods for 
which they have the greatest comparative disadvantage.29  Ri-
cardo was the first in a line of theorists who held that “the un-
derlying assumption of orthodox international trade theory is 
that factors of production, labor and capital, are relatively im-
mobile.”30  As industrialists quickly learned, however, factors 
such as lower wages, lower transportation costs and fewer regu-
latory burdens could justify “direct foreign investment,” a deci-
sion to build production facilities in a foreign country.31  As a 
result, direct foreign investment became a viable alternative to 
trade alone.32  Unlike the theory of foreign trade, the theory of 
direct foreign investment recognizes the mobility of the factors 
of production, and recognizes that manufacturers may transfer 
production facilities across international borders to take advan-
tage of cost-saving circumstances not present in their home 
countries.33  The three NAFTA countries experienced this natu-
  
lawyer to hire the secretary and pay her $40 to type the document in 
two hours while the lawyer is able to sell for $200 the hour of her 
time that would otherwise have been committed to typing the docu-
ment.  In other words, both the lawyer and the secretary gain from 
this exchange. 
Id. at 4. 
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of For-
eign Direct Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 8 (1995). 
 31. Id. at 10 (noting that these cost advantages have been defined as “loca-
tion advantages”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. McClintock explains that 
American transnationals have looked to the Western Hemisphere for 
investment opportunities.  Their first choice has been Mexico where 
the cost of doing business is two-thirds less than in the United 
States…the reason increasing numbers of U.S. companies are choos-
ing Mexico to enhance their competitiveness is because “NAFTA 
made it cost less.” 
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ral evolution from trade to direct foreign investment in their 
developing relationship.34 
From the time of their common origins in the British Empire, 
Canada and the United States have understood the importance 
of maintaining a close trading relationship with its geographic 
neighbors.35  Territorial proximity and the need for peaceful re-
lations were not the only catalysts for trade between the two 
North American neighbors.  Their common heritage, language 
and culture also contributed to the growth in trade and a peace-
  
McClintock, supra note 2, at 77–78.  In examining the amount of direct for-
eign investment in another country, an investor must look at all potential 
costs.  A country such as Mexico may enjoy lower costs among a certain group 
of resources, but those lower costs may not be reason enough to move a plant 
to Mexico because these cost savings may be off-set by higher costs in other 
areas, such as transportation or energy costs due to the lack of an efficient 
infrastructure.  Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Van R. Whiting, Jr., Dynamic Integration, Foreign Investment, 
and Open Regionalism in the NAFTA and the Americas, in NAFTA AS A 
MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT 46, 51–54 (Richard S. Belous & Jonathan Lemco eds. 
1995) (describing the evolution of foreign investment in Latin America during 
the Twentieth Century); Alan M. Rugman & Michael Gestrin, NAFTA’s Treat-
ment of Foreign Investment, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NAFTA 47–51 (Alan 
M. Rugman ed., 1994) (presenting data that demonstrates the degree to which 
North America has become a significant host for foreign direct investment); 
Hugh G. J. Aitken, The Changing Structure of the Canadian Economy, in 
HUGH G.J. AITKEN ET AL., THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC IMPACT ON CANADA 6–7 
(Duke University Press 1959) (noting that Canada’s economic development 
“during phases of rapid acceleration” was due in large part to the transfer “of 
capital, labor, technology, and entrepreneurship originating in other coun-
tries” including the United States); JOHN HERD THOMPSON & STEPHEN J. 
RANDALL, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: AMBIVALENT ALLIES 57 (3d ed. 
2002) (noting that high tariffs in 1879 provided an early incentive for U.S. 
multinationals like the Singer sewing machine company to build plants in 
Canada and reporting that sixty-five such plants existed by 1887).  See gener-
ally RALPH H. FOLSOM & W. DAVIS FOLSOM, UNDERSTANDING NAFTA AND ITS 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS 71–77 (1997) (describing the business 
growth strategies of multinational corporations in North America). 
 35. See generally FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 34, at 60–62 (describing 
trade between the two countries as an alternative to annexation of Canada 
following the American Revolution); ROBERT CRAIG BROWN, CANADA’S 
NATIONAL POLICY 1883-1900: A STUDY IN CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS 8–10 
(1964) (noting that a “desire to establish a wide measure of reciprocal trade 
with the United States has been a persistent theme in Canadian history” sup-
ported by both liberals and conservatives with the only difference between 
them being “one of degree, not of kind”). 
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ful coexistence.36  Since at least the time of the American Revo-
lution, politicians on either side of the border have worked to 
establish a solid foundation for trade — a foundation upon 
which the two sides could mutually benefit.37  Some of the first 
trading treaties included the Elgin-Marcy Reciprocity Treaty, 
which focused on natural resources and tariffs, which were key 
sources of governmental revenue.38  Eventually, Americans and 
  
 36. See generally FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 34, at ch. 3 (describing 
international business relations prior to NAFTA); B.U. Ratchford, Introduc-
tory Statement, in THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC IMPACT ON CANADA vii (Duke Uni-
versity Press 1959) (explaining that the “long tradition of friendly relations 
and good will between the two countries” was due to “a common background 
and…political philosophy” as well as similarities between language, culture 
and economic institutions).  See also Carol Wise, NAFTA, Mexico, and the 
Western Hemisphere, in THE POST-NAFTA POLITICAL ECONOMY: MEXICO AND 
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 8 (Carol Wise ed., 1998) (describing the Canadian 
Free Trade Agreement as “an evolutionary phenomenon” because of the 
“highly homogeneous nature of the two countries, including similar factor 
endowments and levels of development, and the dominant role that each coun-
try played in the other’s trade and investment portfolio”). 
 37. FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 34, at 60.  See also THOMPSON & 
RANDALL, supra note 34, at 16–17 (noting that “the border was wide open to 
commerce, and transborder travel” until the War of 1812).  See also id. at 59 
(describing the late Nineteenth Century “Commercial Union movement,” 
which promoted “the establishment of a common market between the United 
States and Canada”). 
The idea of a Commercial Union with the United States was not new.  
Making the North American continent an economic unit had been 
much more the direct concern of the Montreal merchants in 1849 
than political unity.  And, of course, economic cooperation between 
the two North American nations was and is a continuing feature of 
Canadian history.  The real question was one of degree -- how far 
should cooperation go? 
BROWN, supra note 35, at 127. 
From the winning of independence in 1783…American trade goals 
with respect to the Canadas and the other British colonies were clear 
and unchanging….American policymakers looked forward to the dis-
mantling of the exclusive imperial trading system -- which would give 
American merchants access to Canada and the other British North 
American colonies. 
GORDON T. STEWART, THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO CANADA SINCE 1776 40 
(1992). 
 38. Gerald K. McKim, Comment, United States-Canadian Free Trade: 
Economic Repercussions of the CFTA and NAFTA on the United States, Can-
ada and the Great Lakes Region, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 485, 487–88, (1994). 
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Canadians began to believe that a united Canada and United 
States would provide the most profitable relation for the two 
countries.39  However, because Canadian politicians did not be-
lieve that annexation by the United States was in their best 
interest, they agreed, instead, to broad-based trade agree-
ments.40  These agreements suppressed talk of annexation, and, 
except for the War of 1812, Canada and the United States have 
been blessed with a peaceful co-existence.41 
Relations between the United States and Mexico, on the other 
hand, were not only rocky but outright hostile for much of the 
Nineteenth Century.42  The history of United States interven-
tion in Mexico and other parts of Latin America made Mexico 
much more cautious about opening any doors to the United 
States.43  This differing history of diplomatic relations has af-
fected the way in which Canada and Mexico deal with the 
United States, and therefore also has affected the politics of 
  
The evolution of a U.S.-Canada trade relationship can be traced back 
to 1854 with the signing of the Elgin-Marcy Reciprocity Treaty. The 
treaty, intended to foster limited free trade between the countries, 
proved highly beneficial for Canada but was abandoned by the United 
States due to economic and ideological conflicts. The dissolution of 
this agreement was a unifying force in Canada and led to the forma-
tion of the Confederation in 1867.  Subsequent efforts to formulate 
similar agreements in 1869, 1871 and 1874 fell victim to protectionist 
U.S. trade policies which had been implemented during the interim 
period.  Rebuffed in their efforts to open trade, the Canadians, led by 
Prime Minister John MacDonald, adopted the National Policy of 
1879.  The policy’s purpose was twofold: (1) to protect Canadian 
manufacturing concerns through high tariffs and (2) to pressure the 
United States into negotiating another trade agreement.  While the 
latter goal was never realized, the former was achieved all too well. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 39. FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 34, at 60. 
 40. Id. at 59–62; STEWART, supra note 37, at 49 (describing how the Gover-
nor General of Canada, Lord Elgin, staved off calls for annexation by “negoti-
ating access to the American market”). 
 41. See id. at 30 (discussing the relationship between the U.S. and Can-
ada). 
 42. “According to historian Stanley R. Ross, Mexicans perceive their rela-
tionship with the United States as one shaped by ‘armed conflict, military 
invasion, and economic and cultural penetration.’”  ROBERT T. MORAN & 
JEFFREY ABBOT, NAFTA: MANAGING THE CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 30 (1994) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 43. Id. 
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trade and trade relations.44  As the United States pursues an 
FTAA, other Latin American countries exhibit the same level of 
distrust first voiced by Mexico.45 
Distrust of U.S. foreign policy began almost immediately af-
ter Mexico gained its independence from Spain.46  In 1822, 
President James Monroe recognized the existence of a Mexican 
empire, but thereafter failed to appoint an ambassador to pur-
sue closer relations.47  Monroe eventually appointed Joel Poin-
sett in 1825 as minister plenipotenciary, but Poinsett’s med-
dling in Mexican domestic politics eventually led to his recall in 
1829.48  Poinsett returned to the United States having failed to 
establish a treaty of friendship and commerce with Mexico.49  
After Texas gained its independence from Mexico in 1836, it 
was only a matter of time before the United States annexed 
Texas (in 1845) and set its sites on California and other parts of 
the Southwest.50  Skirmishes along the Rio Grande River, rec-
ognized by the United States as the international boundary, but 
disputed as such by Mexico, provided U.S. President Polk and 
Congress the excuse they needed to declare war on Mexico.51  
The Mexican-American War (or the “War of Northern Aggres-
sion” as Mexicans refer to it) finally ended in 1848 with the 
signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.52  However, during 
the intervening period, Mexico lost half of its North American 
territories.53  The loss of such a large portion of its sovereign 
territory to the United States and the economic damage caused 
by years of war left the Mexican government with few resources 
in its treasury.  It also planted a seed of suspicion within the 
  
 44. See id. at 30–31 (describing the history of diplomatic relations). 
 45. McClintock, supra note 2, at 10–11. 
 46. Josefina Zoraida Vazquez, War and Peace with the United States, in 
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF MEXICO 346 (Michael M. Brescia, trans., Michael C. 
Meyer & William H. Beezley eds., 2000). 
 47. Id. at 346. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 346–47. 
 50. Id. at 354–59. 
 51. MORAN & ABBOT, supra note 42, at 30. 
 52. Vasquez, supra note 46, at 356. 
 53. CARLOS FUENTES, A NEW TIME FOR MEXICO 179 (1996). 
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hearts of the Mexican people regarding the future intentions 
that the United States might have toward their territory.54 
Throughout most of the Twentieth Century, it was primarily 
the U.S. economy and not the needs of Mexico that dictated 
trade relations between Mexico and the United States.55  As a 
result, the United States relaxed its immigration laws during 
periods when it required cheap labor, but immediately tight-
ened them when American economic policy called for it.56  Such 
policies only increased Mexico’s distrust of American economic 
policy and American industrial expansion into Mexico.57  These 
nationalistic pressures in Mexico, in part, led to its expropria-
tion of foreign-owned oil and gas industries in Mexico during 
the administration of Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas in 
1938.58  The expropriations reduced foreign investment in Mex-
ico, a trend that continued through the 1970s.59  Oil exports 
funded Mexico’s economy during this period, but the precipitous 
fall in oil prices during the late 1970s and early 1980s led to 
Mexico’s economic decline.60  Faced with a declining balance of 
trade, Mexico realized that it needed to relax its foreign trade 
investment laws, which had banned foreign investors and al-
lowed inefficient industries to survive.61  The liberalization of 
  
 54. Paul Vanderwood, Betterment for Whom? The Reform Period: 1855-75, 
in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF MEXICO 371 (Michael M. Brescia, trans., Michael 
C. Meyer & William H. Beezley eds., 2000). 
 55. See, e.g., Victoria Lehrfeld, Patterns of Migration: The Revolving Door 
from Western Mexico to California and Back Again, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 209, 217–
19 (1995) (discussing the effects of the economic climate of the U.S. in the 
Twentieth Century on the migration of Mexican nationals). 
 56. Id. at 209 (describing the pattern and attitudes of the U.S. regarding 
immigration from Mexico). 
 57. Mexico was not the only American neighbor to question such policies.  
Canada was also suspicious of initial overtures made by the U.S. calling for 
greater North American integration.  “At the time, neither Canada nor Mexico 
responded with any enthusiasm, citing historical concerns about heavy U.S. 
influence over both countries, and a fear of being swallowed up by powerful 
U.S. competitors.”  Wise, supra note 36, at 7. 
 58. FUENTES, supra note 53, at 179. 
 59. See Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign 
Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 259, 297–99 (1994). 
 60. Id. at 299. 
 61. Wise explains that 
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Mexico’s foreign investment laws reached its zenith in 1990 
when Mexican President Carlos Salinas asked U.S. President 
George H. W. Bush to consider establishing a free trade agree-
ment with Mexico similar to the 1989 trade agreement between 
Canada and the United States.62  The United States was only 
too happy to oblige Mexico’s request.63 
Many viewed NAFTA as a response to a growing sense that 
the United States was losing its global trade preeminence.64  By 
the mid-1980s the European Union (“EU”) began to strengthen 
and the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) 
stalled.65  The United States was concerned that the EU would 
  
as the competition to attract foreign capital became more fierce in the 
new post-Cold War context, President [Carlos] Salinas grew more 
willing to tread where his predecessor had feared to go: despite dec-
ades of diplomatic acrimony and mutual suspicion between Mexico 
and the United States, Salinas buried the hatchet and aggressively 
pursued an FTA with the Bush administration. 
Wise, supra note 36, at 11. 
 62. Id. at 7–8. 
 63. Id. at 9 (discussing the U.S. policy of embracing deals such as the Can-
ada-United States Free Trade Agreement, which “offered more immediate 
prospects for guaranteed market access”). 
 64. This fear continues to drive the United States’ pursuit of the FTAA: 
[T]he United States is a party to only two of the more than 130 free 
trade agreements in the world; the United States belongs to only one 
of the 30 free trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere.  When 
multiplied across products and countries, the cost to America’s 
strength…of falling behind on trade soars exponentially. 
Robert Zoellick, Countering Terror With Trade, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at 
A35. 
Another example of how the United States counters EU influence is 
the 2002 agreement with Chile.  Although discussions with Chile 
about an agreement began in 1990 under the first Bush administra-
tion, it was not until Chile reached an agreement with the European 
Union in early 2002 that the United States finally signed a trade 
agreement. 
Altieri, supra note 2, at 869. 
 65. The United States had long been involved in discussions to expand the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) into a more comprehensive 
World Trade Organization.  However, negotiations stalled, and the United 
States was eager to embark upon bilateral trade agreements in the hopes of 
igniting interest in the stagnating Uruguay Rounds of the GATT.  THOMAS O. 
BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. 
TRADE POLICY 16–17 (1994); Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla et al., Regional Agreements 
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come to dominate the world economic market, and it was de-
termined to create an equally strong economic force in the 
Americas in order to compete globally.66  Although the United 
States was interested in maintaining its global trade status, it 
also wanted to create economic and political stability in its 
neighbor to the south.67  Through much of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, Mexico’s economy was mixed, consisting of many state-
owned corporations and possessing many characteristics of a 
  
and the World Trade Organization Negotiations, 85 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 3, 679 
(2003).  The planned trade agreements with Canada and Mexico had their 
desired effect, and the Uruguay rounds were underway by September 1986, 
only three months after the U.S. and Canada had begun negotiations to estab-
lish the Canadian Free Trade Agreement.  See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., 
NAFTA, A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSE BOOK 37 (2000).  As a result, negotia-
tions for both NAFTA and the WTO were conducted almost contemporane-
ously; and not coincidently, the two agreements share many commonalities.  
Id. at 38. 
 66. See generally Wise, supra note 36, at 9 (describing how “the declining 
competitiveness of U.S. goods in foreign markets” and the “slowness with 
which the GATT’s Uruguay Round negotiations moved forward in the late 
1980s” forced the U.S. to focus more upon bilateral trade agreements like 
NAFTA).  Global competition continues, at least in part, to drive U.S. trade 
policy. 
The main objective for which Bush sought TPA [Trade Promotion Au-
thority] was creation of an FTAA.  As with NAFTA, one of the selling 
points of the FTAA is that it will help the United States preserve its 
access to neighboring countries’ markets, while keeping the Europe-
ans and Japanese out.  It thus locked Canada and Mexico into Amer-
ica’s net and out of the reach of the Europeans.  In that way, NAFTA 
has served American interests by creating a regional block that, if 
united, could become powerful enough to take on competition, pri-
marily from the EU. 
Altieri, supra note 2, at 866 (internal citations omitted); McClintock, supra 
note 2, at 44 (“NAFTA was the response to the emergence of the EU and Ja-
pan as well as Asia as world trade rivals”).  For a detailed explanation of 
Trade Promotion Authority see infra notes 79–89 and accompanying text. 
 67. “US officials argued that NAFTA could yield important benefits not 
only for economic growth but also for a range of political objectives, including 
promoting democracy in Mexico and contributing to a long-term solution to 
immigration problems.”  SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 9.  U.S. trade policies con-
tinue to pursue goals beyond economic growth.  “Free trade agreements can 
help establish the basic building blocks for sustainable development, including 
private property rights, competition [and] the rule of law.…Most importantly, 
free trade is about freedom and open societies.  These values are at the heart 
of America’s larger reform and development agenda.”  Zoellick, supra note 64, 
at 6. 
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state-planned economy.68  The United States wanted to reshape 
the Mexican economy in its own image, and believed that 
NAFTA could transform Mexico’s economy into a free-market 
economy.69 
In order to transform economic relations between Mexico and 
the United States, NAFTA had to address a variety of issues 
which hampered trade, including high tariffs70 and the web of 
restrictive investment laws that stifled foreign direct invest-
ment in Mexico.71  These issues were appropriately addressed, 
and Congress passed NAFTA in 1993,72 entering into force on 
January 1, 1994.73  At least early on, Mexico gained the most 
from NAFTA, and within three years it had become the second 
largest export market for goods from the United States.74  Be-
tween 1993 and 2001, the amount of trade generated among the 
three countries increased by 109% from $297 billion to $622 
billion.75  However, environmentalists and labor unions have 
highlighted some of the problems NAFTA created.  For in-
stance, environmentalists determined that increased industri-
alization along the U.S.-Mexican border will cause further envi-
ronmental damage, air pollution, water pollution and hazardous 
waste problems.76  As previously noted, however, it is difficult to 
  
 68. Michael Wallace Gordon, Economic Integration in North America —  
An Agreement of Limited Dimensions But Unlimited Expectations, in RALPH H. 
FOLSOM ET AL., NAFTA, A PROBLEM - ORIENTED COURSE BOOK 31 (2000). 
 69. Steven Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Is-
sues in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 
391, 395 (1993). 
 70. Gantz, supra note 16, at 387. 
 71. See id. at 391. 
 72. Stuart Rothenberg, NAFTA’s Strange Bedfellows, WORLD&I, at 
http://www.worldandi.com/specialreport/1993/december/SA10285.htm (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2003). 
 73. See generally NAFTA, supra note 3, at 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.LM. 289. 
 74. In so doing, it overtook Japan, which had previously held this second 
place position.  Gilmore, supra note 1, at 394. 
 75. Dep’t of Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade of Can., NAFTA at Eight: A 
Foundation for Economic Growth, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-
alena/nafta8-section01-en.asp (last modified Apr. 16, 2003). 
 76. Michael Robins, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Inte-
gration of Free Trade and the Environment, 7 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123, 
125 (1993). 
The increased trade and industrial development created by NAFTA, 
however, will have serious detrimental ecological and environmental 
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predict whether NAFTA’s eventual impact will be a net positive 
or negative.77 
NAFTA’s success has encouraged President George W. Bush 
to pursue aggressively expanded trade agreements with other 
nations around the world.78  As did his father, the current 
President believes that fast track authority is vital to the suc-
cess of future trade treaties.79  Fast track authority authorizes 
the United States executive branch to submit fully negotiated 
treaties to Congress for approval without opportunity for con-
gressional amendment.80 
President Bush pursued fast track approval, which he called 
“Trade Promotion Authority,”81 and which was passed in the 
House by a very thin margin in July of 2002 by a vote of 215-
212, and in the Senate the following month by a vote of 64-34.82  
Bush wasted no time in using the new Trade Promotion Author-
ity by signing a free trade agreement with Chile on December 
  
effects. For example, along the 2000 mile border shared by the United 
States and Mexico, there is a history of ecological damage from past 
intensification of industrial operations. This gives environmentalists 
good reason to be concerned about NAFTA, for the agreement may 
also lead to an increase in industrial operations, thus causing further 
environmental damage. Intensified industrial operations could 
worsen air and water pollution and intensify the hazardous waste 
disposal problem. Opponents of NAFTA also fear that some American 
companies will use Mexico as a pollution haven, and that free trade 
will lead to challenges to United States health and environmental 
laws as unfair trade barriers. 
Id. 
 77. For further analysis on this issue, see supra notes 1–2 and accompany-
ing text. 
 78. RICHARD E. FEINBERG, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 
SUMMITRY IN THE AMERICAS: A PROGRESS REPORT 45 (1997). 
 79. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Bush to Push Congress to Grant Him Special 
WTO Negotiating Powers, July 2, 2001, available at http://www.common 
dreams.org/headlines01/0702-01.htm. 
 80. See McClintock, supra note 2, at 11–20 (explaining the history and 
evolution of the fast-track procedure). 
 81. “Bush was recently granted Trade Promotion Authority (“TPA”) or ‘fast 
track.’  With TPA, presidents can negotiate trade deals that Congress must 
then ratify or reject, but which they cannot amend.  TPA makes enacting 
trade agreements much easier.”  Altieri, supra note 2, at 847. 
 82. Carolyn Lochhead, Senate Gives Bush Free-Trade Victory, S.F. CHRON., 
Aug. 2, 2002, at A1. 
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11, 2002,83 another with Singapore in January of 200384 and a 
third with four Central American nations in December of 2003.85  
Congress approved the first two of these trade pacts during the 
summer of 2003,86 but the Central American Free Trade Agree-
ment may not be voted on until after the November 2004 elec-
tions.87  President Bush views these agreements as only the first 
of many bilateral trade agreements that his Administration will 
complete over the next several years.88  More importantly, how-
  
 83. Elizabeth Becker & Larry Rohter, U.S. and Chile Reach Free Trade 
Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at C1. 
 84. ASSOC. PRESS, U.S. Reports a Final Deal for Singapore Trade Pact, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at C19. 
 85. Christopher Marquis, Latin Allies of the U.S.: Docile and Reliable No 
Longer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at A8; Patrick Courreges, Trade Vote Could 
be Delayed a Year: Sugar Lobbyist Unhappy with Bush Administration, 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, LA), Jan. 28, 2004, available at http://2theadv 
ocate.com/stories/011204/new_sugar001.shtml (The U.S.’s Central American 
Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) partners include Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala.).  Id.  Only four of the five Central 
American partners signed the December 2003 agreement.  Costa Rica post-
poned further negotiations explaining it needed more time to evaluate 
CAFTA’s impact on various markets including telecommunications, insur-
ance, textile and agriculture.  Trade Scene: No Bore in 2004, J. OF COM. 
ONLINE, Jan. 9, 2004.  Isidro Lopez, Analysis: Region Places Its Hopes in 
CAFTA, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Jan. 9, 2004, available at http://www.country 
watch.com/@school/as_pf_wire.asp?vCOUNTRY=042&UID=973621.  
 86. Josette Sheeran Shiner, Free Trade Rewards Workers, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 13, 2003, at A27.  The Chile and Singapore free-trade pacts join those 
already in place with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA), as well as two others with 
Israel and Jordan.  The Bush administration is also currently negotiating 
additional free-trade agreements with Morocco, Australia, and the South Afri-
can Customs Union; and it has announced plans for a similar agreement with 
Bahrain.  DOREEN HEMLOCK INT’L, Dominican Republic Gets in Line for Free-
Trade Pact, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug. 18, 2003, at 10 [here-
inafter Dominican Republic Gets in Line for Free-Trade Pact]. 
 87. Courreges, supra note 85 (suggesting that the CAFTA may have a diffi-
cult time being approved because of lobbying by the sugar industry, which 
stands to lose economically as a result of lower sugar prices resulting from the 
tariff-free importation of Central American sugar). 
 88. See Dominican Republic Gets in Line for Free-Trade Pact, supra note 
86, at 10.  The Bush administration is currently negotiating or contemplating 
additional negotiations for free-trade agreements with the Dominican Repub-
lic, Australia, Morocco, Panama, Bahrain, Thailand, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and the five Southern Africa Customs Union countries, which include 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.  Trade Scene: No 
Bore in 2004, supra note 85. 
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ever, President Bush sees Trade Promotion Authority as an es-
sential tool he will use to pass an FTAA.89 
Politicians and citizens of the Americas alike fervently debate 
the relative benefits of an FTAA.90  The Bush Administration 
not only believes that the U.S. economy would benefit from in-
creased free trade, but also argues that the FTAA will provide a 
cure for ailing Latin American economies.91  The political bene-
fits of such an agreement have not been overlooked.  As with 
NAFTA, many political analysts believe that the U.S.’ greatest 
return from a successful FTAA would be the political stability 
achieved from the exportation of democracy and free market 
philosophy to Latin America.92 
  
 89. See Lochhead, supra note 82, at A1. 
 90. “Domestic political support for deeper integration also remains uncer-
tain.  This is no less true for the United States than it is for other countries in 
the hemisphere.”  Stephan Haggard, The Political Economy of Regionalism in 
the Western Hemisphere, in THE POST-NAFTA POLITICAL ECONOMY: MEXICO 
AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 302, 304–05 (Carol Wise ed., 1998). 
 91. “US officials argued that NAFTA could yield important benefits not 
only for economic growth but also for a range of political objectives, including 
promoting democracy in Mexico and contributing to a long-term solution to 
immigration problems.”  SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 9.  U.S. trade policies con-
tinue to pursue goals beyond economic growth.  “Free trade agreements can 
help establish the basic building blocks for sustainable development, including 
private property rights, competition [and] the rule of law.  Most importantly, 
free trade is about freedom and open societies.  These values are at the heart 
of America’s larger reform and development agenda.”  Zoellick, supra note 64, 
at 6. 
 92. At least one Congressman has argued that stability and democracy has 
spread throughout Latin America because of liberalization of trade and inte-
gration of economies.  “We can’t take this for granted.  We cannot assume it 
will always be this way.  The trend towards open markets and democratic rule 
may not continue…economic stagnation breeds political instability, and insta-
bility breeds mass emigration, civil unrest, military conflict, and poverty.”  
Rep. Jim Kolbe, The NAFTA and the Expansion of Free Trade: Current Issues 
and Future Prospects “A View from Capitol Hill,” 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
291, 293 (1997).  President Clinton’s U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador 
Charlene Barshefsky, made a similar argument in 1999 while defending pur-
suit of a Free Trade Area of the Americas stating, “[t]rade integration has 
both benefited from and strengthened peace, freedom, democracy and the rule 
of law throughout the hemisphere.  And the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
will improve, strengthen, and transcend all of this.”  Charlene Barshefsky, 
Keynote Address, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 5 (1999). 
There are a number of very important trade agreements that are be-
ing negotiated right now.  The World Trade Organization has 
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More than a few Latin American leaders are unconvinced 
that the FTAA would provide them with the economic or politi-
cal panacea that the Bush Administration continues to pursue.93  
Perhaps the most important single skeptic of the FTAA is Bra-
zilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva because Brazil, along 
with the United States and Canada, is co-Chair of the FTAA 
negotiations which are scheduled for completion by January 
2005.94  Also, as the largest of the Latin American countries, 
Brazil sees itself as the major U.S. competitor in the Western 
Hemisphere.95  The Workers’ Party of Brazil and Lula, its 
  
launched a new round.  The Free Trade Area of the Americas is being 
negotiated.  So the presidents made it clear that through trade, we 
can not only open up markets to our workers and our businesses all 
across America, but we also will be trading the values that we cher-
ish: democracy and freedom.  And so I’m up here encouraging the 
Senate, asking for the vote. 
Sec. of Commerce Don Evans, Press Conference at the Capitol (Apr. 30, 2002). 
 93. “More and more Latin American countries are wary of [the NAFTA] 
approach.”  McClintock, supra note 2, at 11. 
[President] Bush [faces]...opposition [from] what amounts to a “new 
left” in South America, led by President Néstor Kirchner of Argentina 
and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil.  Those leaders…see 
the world…through their nations’ own wrenching experiences with 
the free market.  Brazil has urged other countries to refuse to ratify 
a…declaration [on] free trade unless Mr. Bush addresses the United 
States’ $20 billion in annual farm subsidies. 
Elisabeth Bumiller & Tim Weiner, At Conference, Fox Backs Bush’s Guest-
Worker Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at A3. 
Governments, often lacking credibility among their people, are find-
ing it easier to row with the tide.  Argentina, a staunch U.S. ally in 
the 1990’s, nowadays defends warmer relations with Cuban dictator 
Fidel Castro and Venezuela’s populist leftist Hugo Chavez as a result 
of popular disillusionment with the IMF and Washington. 
David Luhnow et al., Latin America’s Season of Discontent, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
16, 2003, at A21. 
 94. “Clouds over Quito,” ECONOMIST, Nov. 2–8, 2002, at 41 [hereinafter 
Clouds over Quito].  “Brazil, the largest country and economy in South Amer-
ica, has consistently rejected NAFTA.”  McClintock, supra note 2, at 10. 
 95. Bruner explains that 
Brazil itself feels that it has global competitive potential and finds 
the United States an “overbearing” presence in the hemisphere.  Bra-
zil genuinely “views itself and in many ways is the premier country of 
South America and a competitor of the United States,” and as such 
believes in its own potential to achieve some measure of hegemony in 
South America. 
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leader, have both been skeptical of the FTAA for some time.96  
“The party manifesto says that the FTAA, as currently being 
discussed, is not a free-trade agreement but a process of ‘eco-
nomic annexation’ of Latin America by the United States.”97  
Similarly, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, distancing him-
self from some other Andean leaders, also criticized the pro-
posed FTAA as a “hasty fix” for the impoverished Andean re-
gion.98  Slow economic growth and civil unrest in the Andean 
region have slowed the progress of reforms that are essential to 
forming the foundation of any successful FTAA in the Western 
Hemisphere.99  “Related to these problems, the revival of petty 
nationalism threatens to undercut the political comity required 
to maintain the cohesion of their integration initiatives and to 
work together to conclude the FTAA pact.”100  The seed of dis-
  
Bruner, supra note 7, at 29 (internal citations omitted).  Additionally, Schott 
explains that 
[T]he willingness of the trading powers of North and South America 
to engage in broad-based liberalization of their own trade barriers 
will determine the fate of the entire [FTAA] venture.  Bridging the 
gap between the US and Brazilian positions thus will be key to the 
successful end game of the negotiations. 
SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 114; “The United States, Brazil, and Mexico together 
account for more than 85 percent of Western Hemisphere GDP and two-thirds 
of its population.”  Id. at 2. 
 96. Clouds over Quito, supra note 94, at 41. 
 97. Id. at 41.  See also Altieri, supra note 2, at 872 (describing da Silva’s 
anti-FTAA stance). 
 98. Alexandra Olson, Chavez Opens Andean Summit, THE NEWS (Mexico 
City), June 24, 2001, at 10.  Chavez continues to accuse the United States of 
unwanted intervention in Latin America. 
In a Sept. 7 radio monologue, the president charged the Bush ad-
ministration with trying to interfere in Venezuela as previous U.S. 
administrations did against socialist governments in Chile in 1973 
and in Nicaragua in the 1980s.  “I say to the United States that the 
day must come when that interventionist obsession must end,” Mr. 
Chavez said. 
Marc Lifsher, Venezuela’s Chavez Ratchets Up Anti-U.S. Rhetoric, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 23, 2003, at A22.  Chavez has gone on to refer to the FTAA as a form of 
“economic colonialism” that is meant to “hand our countries over to multina-
tionals.”  BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Venezuela: Chavez Criticizes Central 
Bank, FTAA, Chile, in “Hello President,” Dec. 31, 2003. 
 99. See SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 105. 
 100. Id. 
 
File: RamirezMacro3.22.04.doc Created on:  3/22/2004 2:25 PM Last Printed: 4/8/2004 1:36 PM 
638 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
trust planted by United States interventionist policies in Mex-
ico and Latin America during the early Nineteenth Century has 
germinated and its roots continue to grow and expand through-
out Latin America.101  These obstacles of history, culture and 
  
“If you talk to average people about the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas or even the gas export law, they really don’t know much 
about them,” said Eduardo Gamarra, a Bolivian scholar who is direc-
tor of the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at Flor-
ida International University in Miami.  “But Evo Morales [leader of 
the Bolivian coca growers federation and 2002 Bolivian presidential 
candidate] and others have shrewdly used those ideas as a flag which 
plays on their deepest fears, the loss of identity and the giving away 
of what they consider to be their national patrimony.” 
Larry Rohter, Bolivia’s Poor Proclaim Abiding Distrust of Globalization, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at A3.  At a recent regional anti-globalization forum in 
Argentina, Mr. Morales maintained that the United States and multinational 
companies have “a plan to exterminate the Indian” in order to seize control of 
the riches of Bolivia and neighboring countries.  Id. 
 101. Luhnow, de Córdoba and Marc Lifsher explain that 
[m]ayhem in the streets of several Latin American cities, including a 
virtual siege of Bolivia’s pro-U.S. president by angry protesters, 
shows that the region’s disaffected are increasingly making their 
voices heard.  Like the so-called Arab street in the Middle East, pub-
lic protest in this impoverished region is growing more violent and 
anti-American, and is starting to limit policy choices for regional 
leaders. 
Luhnow, et al., supra note 93, at A21.  “Brazil is fundamentally uncomfortable 
with U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.  It has been argued that, 
because of the excessive focus on the relationship between the dominant bipo-
lar system and regions as subordinated systems during the Cold War, the role 
of middle powers like Brazil has been under theorized.”  Bruner, supra note 7, 
at 28 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  “The United States, 
which has often viewed most nations of Latin America as reliable and docile 
allies, is increasingly facing resentment over security and trade policies that 
some of them view as inimical to their interests.”  Marquis, supra note 85, at 
8A (internal citations omitted). 
Across South America, labor unions, student and civic groups and a 
new wave of leaders — Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Luiz Inacio Lula 
da Silva in Brazil, and Nestor Kirchner in Argentina — are express-
ing similar doubts about who actually benefits from a free flow of in-
ternational trade and investment. 
… 
“Globalization is just another name for submission and domination,” 
Nicanor Apaza, 46, an unemployed miner, said…“We’ve had to live 
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language are not unusual when it comes to international trade.  
However, the Partner Nations must recognize and address 
these obstacles before they can move on to develop a workable 
structure for an agreement that will form the FTAA.102 
II. NAFTA AND ITS RULES OF ORIGIN 
A. Legal Authority for NAFTA 
NAFTA is often referred to as a treaty.  However, it did not 
enter the U.S. legal lexicon through the Article II treaty-making 
power extended to the President and Congress under the Con-
stitution, which requires senatorial “Advice and Consent.”103  
Rather, it became a part of U.S. law as a result of a Congres-
  
with that here for 500 years, and now we want to be our own mas-
ters.” 
… 
He and many other protesters see an unbroken line from this region’s 
often rapacious colonial history to the failed economic experiments of 
the late 20th century, in which Bolivia was one of the first Latin 
American countries to open itself to the modern global economy. 
Larry Rohter, Bolivia’s Poor Proclaim Abiding Distrust of Globalization, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at A3. 
 102. “Extending NAFTA throughout the hemisphere requires a change in 
perspective and approach.  The sheer number and variety of states in the re-
gion make the traditional approach to harmonization less practical.  Adding to 
the complexity of harmonization are the varying legal traditions that the 
states in the hemisphere have.”  O’Hop, supra note 8, at 163. 
Although all of the 30 [Latin American] reciprocal agreements…are 
linked to the objectives of the “new regionalism” approach, each coun-
try has pursued its own strategic trade objectives with its own tariff 
reduction scheme, rules of origin, and technical, procedural and even 
documental systems.  This has given rise to what some observers 
have dubbed the ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect of trade agreements. 
Antoni Estevadeordal, The Impact of Free Trade Agreements on the Pattern 
of Trade (Presentation given at Meeting of the Trade and Integration Network 
of the Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.) (May 29–30, 
2003) (IPES-2003), at 3, at http://www.iadb.org/int/DRP/ing/Red1/documents/ 
Estevadeordal-5-03eng.pdf. 
 103. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2.  “[The President] shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur.”  Id. 
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sional-Executive Agreement.104  Since the founding of the nation, 
Presidents have made approximately sixteen hundred treaties 
under the Article II treaty-making power.105  But Presidents also 
have made countless other foreign compacts without Senate 
approval.106  Some of these more recent agreements were in the 
form of a Congressional-Executive Agreement in which Con-
gress either grants the President advance authority to make 
agreements or ratifies the President’s action by a joint resolu-
tion of Congress.107 
It is now widely accepted that the Congressional-Executive 
agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is a 
complete alternative to a treaty: the President can seek ap-
proval of any agreement by joint resolution of both houses of 
Congress rather than by two-thirds of the Senate.  Like a 
treaty, such an agreement is the law of the land.108 
As previously discussed, Trade Promotion Authority grants 
the President power to negotiate trade treaties and present 
them to both houses of Congress for a simple majority vote.109  
By using this method of approval, the President avoids the req-
uisite approval of two-thirds of the Senate dictated by Article II 
of the Constitution.110  Although “[t]he Constitution does not 
expressly confer authority to make international agreements 
other than treaties,…such agreements, varying widely in for-
mality and in importance, have been common from our early 
history.”111  For this reason, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit refused to find NAFTA unconstitutional de-
  
 104. See McClintock, supra note 2, at 11–13 (explaining the history of the 
congressional-executive agreement). 
 105. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 215–18 (1996). 
 106. Id. at 215. 
 107. Id. at 215–18. 
 108. McClintock, supra note 2, at 33 (the author goes on to explain the Con-
stitutional history of the Congressional-Executive agreement). 
 109. Becker & Rohter, supra note 83, at C1; Lochhead, supra note 82, at A1. 
 110. Becker & Rohter, supra note 83, at C1. 
 111. HENKIN, supra note 105, at 215–18 (internal citations omitted).  See 
also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States, Section 
303 (2) (“The President, with the authorization or approval of Congress, may 
make an international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within 
the powers of Congress and of the President under the Constitution.”). 
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spite the fact that it had not been promulgated through the 
treaty-making Clause.112 
NAFTA consists of twenty-two chapters that cover everything 
from Objectives in Chapter One113 to Exceptions and Final Pro-
visions in Chapters Twenty-One and Twenty-Two.114  In addi-
tion, the agreement includes environmental and labor-side 
agreements as well as various annexes and rules of procedure.115  
However, Chapter Four, which lays out the rules of origin, is 
the heart of NAFTA.116 
B. Rules of Origin – The Heart of NAFTA 
Any study of a free trade agreement must begin with an un-
derstanding of the rules of origin and why they are so important 
to the heart of the Agreement.117  A free trade agreement is an 
agreement whereby two or more nations agree to reduce tariffs 
and other barriers to trade so that goods may cross the interna-
tional borders free of any barriers to trade, hence the name free 
trade.118  In order for an FTA to operate effectively, the partner 
nations must devise a method by which customs inspectors at 
each border crossing can determine the origin of the goods being 
transported.119  Unless customs agents are able to distinguish 
between goods entitled to receive free trade benefits (those 
goods originating within the free trade area) and goods not so 
entitled, there is a danger that a partner nation will accept im-
ported goods from outside the trade area without being paid the 
appropriate tariff.120  Any FTA would collapse if it failed to pro-
  
 112. Made in the USA Found. v. U.S., 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001).  See 
also McClintock, supra note 2, at 34–35 (outlining the arguments presented to 
the Eleventh Circuit). 
 113. NAFTA, supra note 3, 107 Stat. 2061–2122, 32 I.L.M. 289, 297–93 (con-
taining chs. 1–9). 
 114. NAFTA, supra note 3, 107, Stat. 2061–2225, 32 I.L.M. 299–605 (con-
taining chs. 1–22), Annex 2004 (1), (2), 32 I.L.M. 699. 
 115. See NAFTA, supra note 3, 107 Stat. 2163–65, 32 I.L.M. 605. 
 116. NAFTA, supra note 3, 107 Stat. 2069–86, 32 I.L.M. 349–58.  
 117. For the NAFTA Rules of Origin, see NAFTA, supra note 3, 107 Stat. 
2069–86, 32 I.L.M. 349–58. 
 118. SCHOTT, supra note 4, at 84. 
 119. See Pawlak, supra note 16, at 326–27. 
 120. See id.  This sort of situation is referred to as the creation of an “export 
platform.”  See Gantz, supra note 16, at 383 (describing fears that the NAFTA 
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vide for some kind of procedure, like the rules of origin, for 
identifying and preventing non-member goods from taking ad-
vantage of trade benefits meant solely for member nations.121 
The rules of origin outlined in Chapter Four of NAFTA insure 
that only those goods originating within North America benefit 
from free trade.122  Specifically, Article 401 defines when a good 
is “originating” and thereby entitled to the benefits conferred by 
NAFTA.123  The definitions covered by Article 401 range from 
the very simple to the complex.124  “In the simplest definition, 
originating materials are those that are wholly obtained in the 
territory of a party and include minerals extracted, goods har-
vested, and animals born and raised in a NAFTA country’s ter-
ritory.”125  Goods containing non-originating materials (parts or 
inputs that originate from outside the NAFTA member states), 
still may enjoy free trade benefits if “each of the non-originating 
materials used in the production of the good undergoes a 
change in tariff classification set out in Annex 401 as a result of 
production occurring entirely in the territory of one or more of 
the Parties.”126  A “change in tariff classification” occurs when a 
non-originating material is transformed by a North American 
manufacturing process into another product.127  For instance, 
vanilla beans (non-originating material) imported from Mada-
gascar might be transformed by U.S. labor and manufacturing 
resources into “pure vanilla extract.”128  This doctrine of sub-
stantial transformation “has deep roots in the jurisprudence of 
  
might transform Mexico into an export platform “from which Asian parts and 
components would…be exported to the U.S. duty free”).  Id.  
 121. Edwin F. Einstein, NAFTA Trade in Goods, in NAFTA AND BEYOND 57, 
61 (N. Kofele-Kale et al. eds., 1995). 
 122. See, e.g., id. at 61–62. 
 123. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 401(b),  107 Stat. 2069, 32 I.L.M. 349. 
 124. Einstein, supra note 121, at 61–62.  See NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, 
art. 415, 107 Stat. 2081–86, 32 I.L.M. 354. 
 125. Einstein, supra note 121, at 61–62 (citing to NAFTA, ch. 4, arts. 401(a), 
32 I.L.M. 349 & 415(a)–(c), 32 I.L.M. 354). 
 126. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 401(b), 107 Stat. 2069, 32 I.L.M. 349. 
 127. Id. ch. 4, art. 401 (b), 107 Stat. 2070, 32 I.L.M. 349.  See also Einstein, 
supra note 121, at 62 (“[N]on-originating materials that…undergo a defined 
change in tariff classification…as a result of production occurring within the 
territory of one or more of the parties, are generally considered as originat-
ing.”). 
 128. See NAFTA, supra note 3, Annex 401, 32 I.L.M. 397.  See also Einstein, 
supra note 121, at 62. 
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the Supreme Court,”129 and was adopted as a statutory rule of 
origin in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.130  The substantial 
transformation test proved to be inexact because its application 
relied on subjective evaluations, the outcomes of which de-
pended on whether the final product of the U.S. manufacturing 
process had a new name, character or use.131  NAFTA replaced 
the substantial transformation test with a more precise method 
of evaluating the degree of transformation by utilizing the Har-
monized Tariff Schedule (“HTS”) classification system.132  The 
HTS numerically “identifies items along a progression from raw 
materials to finished products,” providing customs officials with 
a tool to precisely measure degrees of transformation.133  By 
employing the HTS numerical classification system, NAFTA 
can specify a precise transformation (“change in tariff classifica-
tion”) that must be achieved in order for a non-originating ma-
terial to be transformed into an originating material or product.  
This, in turn, allows customs officials to apply appropriate trade 
preferences or restrictions.134  The one hundred and sixty-nine-
  
 129. RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 292 
(2d ed. 2001) (citing Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n v. United States, 207 U.S. 
556 (1908)). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Michael P. Maxwell, Formulating Rules of Origin for Imported Mer-
chandise: Transforming the Substantial Transformation Test, 23 GEO. WASH. 
J. INT’L LAW & ECON. 669, 672–73 (1990). 
 132. RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 291 
(2d ed. 2001). 
For decades, most of the countries in the world, except the United 
States and Canada, classified imports according to the Brussels Tariff 
Nomenclature (BTN), which identifies items along a progression from 
raw materials to finished products.  The United States had its own 
system of classification set out in the Tariff Schedule of the United 
States (TSUS).  However, beginning in 1982, the United States initi-
ated steps to convert the TSUS into a Harmonized Commodity, De-
scription and Coding System (HS) of classification, in common with 
the classification system used by most other countries and developed 
by the Customs Cooperation Council in Brussels.  The United States 
adopted the Harmonized System as the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
(HTS) for classification of all imports by enactment of the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, with an effective date of Jan. 
1, 1989.  Many nations have adopted HS and use it for U.S. exports. 
Id. at 291. 
 133. Id. at 290–91. 
 134. See generally NAFTA, supra note 3, Annex 401, 32 I.L.M. 397. 
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page “Annex 401” establishes the degree of transformation re-
quired for a non-originating material to convert into an origi-
nating material.135  The transformation occurs when the non-
originating material is transformed to such a degree that its 
HTS classification number shifts to a different classification 
level as outlined in Annex 401.136  Goods that undergo this “tar-
iff shift” receive free trade benefits under NAFTA because the 
additional North American labor and resources used to trans-
form the non-originating material are deemed to have contrib-
uted sufficiently to the North American economy to grant the 
status of “originating good” upon the resulting product.137  “In 
order to be considered as originating, goods containing non-
originating materials that do not undergo a sufficient change of 
tariff classification, and even many that do but with a further 
qualification defined in Annex 401, must fulfill the regional 
value content requirement of Article 402 of NAFTA.”138 
Under Annex 401 as well as under Article 401(d), certain 
products may achieve originating status even if they do not 
meet a required tariff shift so long as the product contains a 
minimum percentage of labor, materials or overhead (known as 
“inputs”) from North America.139  The percentage of a product’s 
North American input is referred to as a product’s regional 
value content.140  Granting originating status to a good with 
something less than 100% regional value content is justified 
because a good can make a substantial contribution to the 
North American economy even if 100% of the inputs do not 
originate in North America.141  Annex 401 also may require that 
this “regional value content” be met in addition to a specified 
  
 135. See id. Annex 401, 32 I.L.M. 397. 
 136. See Einstein, supra note 121, at 62. 
 137. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 401(b), 107 Stat. 2069, 32 I.L.M. 349.  
See also Einstein, supra note 121, at 62 (“Inputs from outside the NAFTA, 
called non-originating materials, that are incorporated into a good and un-
dergo defined change of tariff classification, as described in Annex 401, as a 
result of production occurring within the territory of one or more of the par-
ties, are generally considered as originating.”). 
 138. Einstein, supra note 121, at 62–63. 
 139. Id. at 62. 
 140. Id. at 62–63 (citing NAFTA ch. 4, art. 402(3), 107 Stat. 2070, 32 I.L.M 
349). 
 141. Id. at 63 (citing NAFTA, ch. 4, arts. 401(c), 107 Stat. 2069, 32 I.L.M. 
349 & 402(4), 107 Stat. 2070, 32 I.L.M. 350). 
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tariff shift for certain goods.142  Article 402 provides for two 
methods of calculating the regional value content: the “transac-
tion value method” and the “net cost method.”143 
The first step in calculating the regional value content is de-
termining either the product’s transaction value144 or its net 
cost,145 depending on the method to be used.146  Once the transac-
tion value or the net cost is determined, the formula for deter-
mining the regional value content is a simple matter of arith-
metic.147  The regional value content (“RVC”) of a good using the 
transaction value method is calculated by applying the follow-
ing formula: RVC = ((TV-VNM)/TV) x 100, where TV is the 
transaction value of the good and VNM is the value of the non-
originating material used in the production of the good.148  The 
result from this formula reflects the percentage of the transac-
tion value of the good that contains originating material.149  If 
originating material accounts for 60% or more of the transac-
tion value, then the good is deemed originating.150 
The regional value content of a good using the net cost 
method is calculated by using a similar formula: RVC = ((NC-
  
 142. Id. at 62–63. 
 143. Id.  See also TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 20, at 126. 
 144. The transaction value is “the price actually paid or payable for a good 
or material.”  NAFTA, supra note 3, at ch. 4, art. 415, 107 Stat. 2081, 32 
I.L.M. 354–57. 
 145. The net cost is defined as the “total cost minus sales promotion, mar-
keting and after-sales service costs, royalties, shipping and packing costs, and 
non-allowable interest costs that are included in the total cost.”  NAFTA, su-
pra note 3, ch. 4, art. 415, 107 Stat. 2081, 32 I.L.M. 354–57. 
 146. Einstein, supra note 121, at 63. 
 147. See NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 402(2), 107 Stat. 2070, 32 I.L.M. 
349. 
 148. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 402(2), 107 Stat. 2070, 32 I.L.M. 349. 
 149. See id.  Since VNM (value of non-originating material) is subtracted 
from TV, only originating material is left as a percentage of TV.  Id. 
 150. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 401(d)(ii),  107 Stat. 2069, 32 I.L.M. 
349. 
A good shall originate in the territory of a Party…provided that the 
regional value content of the good, determined in accordance with Ar-
ticle 402, is not less than 60 percent where the transaction value 
method is used, or is not less than 50 percent where the net cost 
method is used, and that the good satisfies all other applicable re-
quirements of this Chapter. 
Id. 
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VNM)/NC) x 100, where NC is the net cost of the good and VNM 
is the value of non-originating materials used in the production 
of the good.151  The result of this formula reflects the percentage 
of the net cost of the good that contains originating material.152  
If originating material accounts for 50% or more of the net cost, 
then the good will qualify for the benefits granted to originating 
goods.153 
The general rule provides that the exporter or producer of a 
good may choose either the transaction value method or the net 
cost method to determine the regional value content.154  Gener-
ally, the transaction value is easier to calculate than the net 
cost method155 because the latter method requires a cost ac-
counting of every resource and component (whether originating 
or not) that goes into manufacturing a particular product.156  In 
certain cases, the producer or manufacturer is prohibited from 
using the more facile transaction value method in determining 
regional value content.157  Article 402(5) lists those situations 
that demand use of the net cost method.158  Among others, these 
situations include: certain cases where the good is sold by a 
producer to a related person,159 where the good is a motor vehi-
  
 151. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 402(3), 107 Stat. 2069, 32 I.L.M. 349. 
 152. Id.  Since VNM (value of non-originating material) is subtracted from 
NC, only originating material is left as a percentage of NC.  See id. 
 153. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 401(d), 107 Stat. 2069, 32 I.L.M. 349. 
 154. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 402(1), 107 Stat. 2070, 32 I.L.M. 349. 
 155. As noted in supra note 144, the transaction value is defined as “the 
price actually paid or payable for a good or material.”  NAFTA, supra note 3, 
ch. 4, art. 415, 107 Stat. 2081, 32 I.L.M. 354–57. 
 156. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 402(3), 107 Stat. 2070, 32 I.L.M. 349 
(providing the net cost method equation as RVC = [(NC-VNM) / NC] x 100, 
with NC representing the net cost of the goods). 
 157. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 402(5), 107 Stat. 2071, 32 I.L.M. 350. 
 158. Id. 
 159. “Related person” is defined in Ch. 4, art. 415 as 
a person related to another person on the basis that:  a) they are offi-
cers or directors of one another’s businesses; b) they are legally rec-
ognized partners in business; c) they are employer and employee; d) 
any person directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds 25 percent or 
more of the outstanding voting stock or shares of each of them; e) one 
of them directly or indirectly controls the other; f) both of them are 
directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; or g) they are 
members of the same family (members of the same family are natural 
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cle and where “the exporter or producer wishes to accumulate 
the regional value content of the good in accordance with Article 
404.”160 
NAFTA prohibits use of the transaction value when related 
persons are involved “…and the volume…exceeds eighty-five 
percent of the producer’s total sales” during a given period161 to 
prevent producers from manipulating intra-company prices to 
generate a false transaction value, which could lead to granting 
a particular product originating status when it might not oth-
erwise be so entitled.  In this sense, NAFTA’s prohibition of the 
transaction value method is no different than the common prac-
tice of many countries that monitor and regulate transfer pric-
ing between subsidiaries of a multinational corporation.162  
Transfer pricing, the act of selling to a related person for a 
higher or lower amount than one would sell in an arms-length 
transaction for the purpose of manipulating profits and, there-
fore, tax consequences in a particular jurisdiction, also can be 
used to make a product appear to be originating even though it 
would not be so designated in a normal arms-length transac-
tion.163 
NAFTA’s rules of origin also include specific exceptions or 
protections for important industries and products.164  For exam-
ple, its rules require that automobile manufacturers use the 
more onerous net cost method rather than the simpler transac-
tion value method in establishing the origination of manufac-
tured vehicles.165  The importance of the American automobile 
industry to the North American economy and the ever-present 
  
or adoptive children, brothers, sisters, parents, grandparents, or 
spouses). 
Id. ch. 4, art. 415, 107 Stat. 2081, 32 I.L.M. 354–57. 
 160. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 402(5)(e), 107 Stat. 2071, 32 I.L.M. 
350.  For a detailed explanation of “accumulation” under Article 404, see infra 
notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
 161. Id. ch. 4, art. 402(5), 107 Stat. 2071, 32 I.L.M. 350. 
 162. For a general discussion of why various nations monitor and regulate 
transfer pricing, see Stephen Linde, Note, Regulation of Transfer Pricing in 
Multinational Corporations: An International Perspective, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 67 (1977). 
 163. Id. at 72–76. 
 164. McKim, supra note 38, at 341. 
 165. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 402(5)(d), 107 Stat. 2071, 32 I.L.M. 
350. 
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threat of international competition were responsible for this 
and other burdens placed on trade in automobiles.166  Not only 
must the automobile industry trace the origination of every ma-
terial that goes into their production, but NAFTA raised the 
percentage of originating materials required for access to trade 
preferences from 50% to 62.5%.167  The two requirements not 
only provide an additional layer of protection for the American 
automobile industry, but also provide an incentive for automo-
bile parts manufacturers, formally located in Asia, to build 
North American plants, because automobile manufacturers now 
will be looking for American-made parts to incorporate into 
their vehicles in order to qualify for NAFTA benefits.168 
Finally, NAFTA requires producers to use the net cost 
method when accumulating the value of originating resources 
used in the production of non-originating components sold to 
them for ultimate incorporation into their own products.169  
Manufacturers can use the accumulation method of valuing 
products when it purchases a component (“part A”) for incorpo-
ration into its newly manufactured product (“product AB”), 
where part A does not qualify as originating under regional 
value content rules even though it does contain some originat-
ing resources.170  If product AB also fails to meet the regional 
value content test, the manufacturer may recalculate the re-
gional value content by breaking the cost of part A into the 
various components that went into part A’s production.171  Thus, 
rather than including the entire cost of part A as non-
originating in calculating the regional value content of product 
AB, the manufacturer can determine how much of part A was 
originating.  After determining this breakdown, the manufac-
turer of product AB can then accumulate the originating portion 
of part A into its own formula for determining the regional 
value content of its product AB.172  The accumulation method, 
  
 166. Pawlak, supra note 16, at 501. 
 167. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 403(5)(a), 107 Stat. 2074, 32 I.L.M. 
351. 
 168. Einstein, supra note 121, at 73. 
 169. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 402(5)(e), 107 Stat. 2071, 32 I.L.M. 
350.   
 170. Id. ch. 4, art. 404(1), 107 Stat. 2076, 32 I.L.M. 352. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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therefore, allows the manufacturer of product AB to take credit 
for any portion of part A classified as originating rather than 
having to count the entire cost of part A as non-originating.  
The additional “credit” that the manufacturer of product AB 
may achieve through this method may be sufficient to reach the 
50% regional value content that would qualify product AB as 
originating, and therefore, eligible for the trade benefits pro-
vided by NAFTA.173 
The rules of origin also provide a de minimis rule,174 exempt-
ing goods from the rules of origin if they contain non-originating 
materials when the non-originating materials do not exceed 7% 
of the transaction value or of the total cost of the good.175  With-
out the de minimis exception, the Annex 401 rules requiring 
non-originating materials to undergo a change in tariff classifi-
cation would weigh harshly on those goods with a very small 
percentage of non-originating materials that do not make the 
required tariff shift. 
As one can see, the NAFTA rules of origin create a complex 
web of restrictions, requirements and exceptions that are diffi-
cult to understand and apply.  These intricacies only compound 
the complexity of a process already made difficult by differences 
in language, culture, and history.  Transferring NAFTA’s rules 
of origin to the FTAA will only make the “dance” among the 
Partner Nations increasingly difficult to perform.  Whatever 
form the FTAA eventually takes, it must account for and adapt 
to the unique economies, cultures, histories and diplomatic rela-
  
 173. For a more detailed example of the accumulation method, see generally 
NAFTA: A Guide to Customs Procedures, U.S. Customs Service, at 
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/nafta/docs/us/guidproc.html#2%20RULES%2
0OF (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).  Recall that Article 402(5)(e) requires use of 
the net cost method of regional valuation when accumulation is used, and 
Article 401(d) tells us that the net cost method must reach at least a fifty per-
cent threshold to be classified as originating.  
 174. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4, art. 405, 107 Stat. 2076–77, 32 I.L.M. 352–
53. 
 175. The de minimis rule provides a certain list of goods that may not bene-
fit from this exception.  Id. ch. 4, art. 405(3), 107 Stat. 2077–78, 32 I.L.M. 
352–53.  It also provides that the de minimus rule for fabrics is based upon 
weight rather than cost, i.e., fabrics containing non-originating fibers or yarns 
will be exempt from the rules of origin if the non-originating components do 
not exceed 7% of the total weight of the finished good.  Id. at ch. 4, art. 405(6), 
107 Stat. 2077, 32 I.L.M. 353. 
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tionships of each additional party.  Rules of origin form the 
heart of any free trade area, and as such, it is the rules of origin 
that are most critical to the success of any FTAA. 
III. RULES OF ORIGIN – HEARTBURN FOR THE FTAA 
Even though the NAFTA rules of origin serve the three 
NAFTA partners well, the rules are not without their detrac-
tors.  Chief among the complaints is that the rules are far too 
complex, and that paradoxically, the rules actually form a bar-
rier to trade more than they dismantle trade barriers.176  The 
complexity of the rules and the cost of resources needed to iden-
tify, understand, track and comply with these rules are espe-
cially costly for developing nations and their industries.177  In 
fact, NAFTA’s rules of origin are so complex that they are ac-
companied by a two hundred page Annex that explains many of 
the intricate technical details an exporter must examine to de-
termine the origination of a particular product.178  Studies that 
have evaluated administrative costs associated with rules of 
origin compliance reveal that companies spend anywhere from 
1.4% to 5.7% of the value of the goods exported.179  Applying 
  
 176. “NAFTA presents one example of how onerous customs procedures can 
be an impediment to trade even after countries have agreed to eliminate bor-
der charges.”  CUSTOMS PROCEDURES AND RULES OF ORIGIN, supra note 11, at 
2–3.  Flatters and Kirk state: 
[R]ules of origin are an essential element of regional trading ar-
rangements. But their use as protectionist devices, whether in North-
South or South-South agreements, can also undermine and subvert 
the benefits of the trade liberalization they are meant to support.  
This is one of the great dangers of regionalism as a strategy for global 
integration. 
Frank Flatters & Robert Kirk, Rules of Origin as Tools of Development, at 1 
(2003) (presented at a conference entitled The Origin of Goods: A Conceptual 
and Empirical Assessment of Rules of Origin in PTAs, sponsored by Institut 
National de la Recherche Agronomique), at http://www.inra.fr/Internet/Depart 
ements/ESR/UR/lea/actualites/ROO2003/articles/flatters.pdf. 
 177. Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla et al., supra note 65, at 5–6. 
 178. DANIELLE GOLDFARB, C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE, COMMENTARY NO. 184, THE 
ROAD TO A CANADA-U.S. CUSTOMS UNION: STEP-BY-STEP OR IN A SINGLE BOUND?, 
4 (2003), available at http://www.cdhowe.org [hereinafter HOWE INSTITUTE 
COMMENTARY]. 
 179. Id. at 8 (“Estimates of rules of origin administrative costs under the 
European Free Trade Association-European Community FTA range from 1.4 
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these same percentages to the combined trade between the 
United States and Canada reveals that the total administrative 
costs of NAFTA’s rules of origin could amount to anywhere from 
$8 billion to $31 billion a year.180  There is some evidence that 
importers and exporters are opting to forgo NAFTA’s free trade 
benefits simply because the costs of compliance with the rules of 
origin are too high.181  Both critics and supporters of the FTAA 
continue to raise concerns that the rules of origin themselves 
may form obstacles to trade.182  The number of concerns and dif-
ficulties identified with regard to the NAFTA rules of origin 
would not disappear if similar rules were incorporated into the 
FTAA, but likely would be magnified because of the greater 
number of partners involved and because of the larger number 
of developing countries with fewer technical resources to aid in 
compliance.183  Adopting rules of origin like NAFTA’s would de-
feat the FTAA’s purpose either by bringing trade to a halt or 
forcing most producers and developing countries to forgo free 
trade benefits due to the exorbitant compliance cost. 
  
percent-to-5.7 percent of the value of export transactions, using company-level 
data.”). 
 180. Id. at 8. 
 181. Tim Tatsuji Shimazaki, Proof of Origin as a Trade Barrier, 1998, re-
printed in RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON & DAVID LOPEZ, 
NAFTA 65–66 (2000). 
In one example, Linda Stepp, a chief financial officer of Televideo, a 
video design and sales company in San Diego, expressed her concerns 
over the amount of documentation necessary in addition to the Cer-
tificate of Origin.  She estimated her cost of complying with NAFTA 
to be about $50 per document after factoring in notarization fee and 
getting things stamped….In another example, at Honeywell Mi-
croswitch in Westmont, Illinois, it took six employees nearly six 
months just to ensure that the company’s products — switches and 
sensors — qualified for the NAFTA’s preferential treatment. 
Id. 
 182. “Origin rules are designed to ensure that benefits from liberalization 
accrue to producers in FTAA countries by preventing free riding by producers 
in non-participating countries.  Often, however, their inherent complexity 
results in the rules becoming obstacles to trade flows under FTAA.”  CUSTOMS 
PROCEDURES AND RULES OF ORIGIN, supra note 11, at 2; see also Mariana C. 
Silveira, Rules of Origin in International Trade Treaties: Towards the FTAA, 
14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 411, 439 (1997) (noting that an FTAA working 
group had identified rules of origin as a potential restriction on free trade). 
 183. See Silveira, supra note 182, at 460–62. 
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Regardless of the type of rules of origin ultimately adopted by 
the FTAA, the Partner Nations would have to harmonize their 
customs procedures to a certain extent if they are to implement 
the rules successfully.  Customs authorities in the various na-
tions cannot consistently apply a set of rules if each applies dif-
ferent sets of procedures that fail to result in a predictable and 
efficient application process.184  Additionally, many Latin Ameri-
can countries lack access to high level technological resources 
available to the developed countries of Europe and North Amer-
ica.185  Such resources aid in updating regulations to reflect 
changing patterns of trade and are essential to policing compli-
ance.186  The World Trade Organization has found that failure to 
modernize and reform customs procedures can produce a bu-
reaucratic barrier to trade that is even more insurmountable 
than high import duties.187  In December 1995, the Chairman 
and CEO of Federal Express in an address to the Air Cargo 
Americas Conference in Miami stated that “[i]t makes little 
sense to have a network like ours that moves goods across con-
tinents in twenty-four to forty-eight hours when those goods 
become entrapped in archaic customs bureaucracies for days.”188  
In order to prevent these kinds of delays, the Partner Nations 
must provide resources for adequate training of customs per-
sonnel who ultimately must apply rules of origin.  In addition, 
the Partner Nations must provide adequate technological re-
sources for administering the rules, particularly to less devel-
oped countries that lack such resources or possess antiquated or 
  
 184. “It is essential for the continued economic expansion of the United 
States that markets in our hemisphere become increasingly open to U.S. 
goods and services and there be clear, predictable and nondiscriminatory rules 
governing trade throughout the Americas.”  McClintock, supra note 2, at 74. 
 185. CUSTOMS PROCEDURES AND RULES OF ORIGIN, supra note 11, at 3. 
 186. See Silveira, supra note 182, at 460. 
 187. Neil King, Jr. & Scott Miller, Cancún: Victory for Whom? Poor Nations’ 
Revolt Could Freeze Them Out of Big Trade Deals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2003, 
at A4 [hereinafter Cancún: Victory for Whom?].  As an example of the costs 
involved with such inefficiencies, some experts “have estimated that new cus-
toms procedures could add nearly 1% to economies of countries across Asia.”  
Id. 
 188. CUSTOMS PROCEDURES AND RULES OF ORIGIN, supra note 11, at 3 (quot-
ing the Chairman and CEO of Federal Express in an address to the Air Cargo 
Americas Conference in Miami in December 1995). 
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incompatible technology.189  Even now, the lack of a modern 
technological and communications infrastructure in some of the 
region’s developing countries prevent traders in those areas 
from determining and implementing developments or improve-
ments that have emerged in either domestic or international 
trade law.190  The simplest of the rules of origin cannot bring 
about free trade in the Americas unless all countries develop 
consistent customs procedures across the Western Hemisphere.  
In addition, they all require access to the resources necessary 
for the efficient, fair and predictable application of the rules of 
origin finally adopted. 
Agreeing on a common set of rules of origin for the FTAA will 
also be difficult both because Latin American nations already 
have adopted rules of origin under various free trade agree-
ments which they have formed over the past two decades and 
because these rules are closely tied to the interests of domestic 
political groups.191  Like NAFTA’s special automobile industry 
provisions, these other trade agreements may contain special 
  
 189. Id. at 5.  See also Pawlak, supra note 16, at 347 (discussing the bur-
dens placed upon shippers and producers that force them to forgo preferential 
treatment as well as the economic strain that would be placed upon poorer 
nations to administer and enforce complicated rules of origin). 
 190. O’Hop, supra note 8, at 164 (“Tools for legal research and reporting, 
which are taken for granted in the developed world, are still the exception in 
the developing world.”). 
 191. “[T]he United States belongs to only one of the 30 free trade agree-
ments in the Western Hemisphere.”  Robert Zoellick, supra note 64, at A35. 
[T]here are over a dozen customs unions and free trade areas involv-
ing Mexico and Latin America….As a practical matter, the overlap of 
these agreements with each other, the GATT/WTO agreements and 
the numerous bilateral agreements that intersperse these multilat-
eral efforts can create a seeming maze of customs, trade and invest-
ment rules. 
Curtiss & Atkinson, supra note 16, at 139–40; 
One of the problems with the approach that is being taken with the 
FTAA negotiations is that the agreement will overlay the 23 trade 
pacts or agreements in the region.  This is further complicating the 
current overlap of many regional and subregional agreements with 
yet another layer of rules and regulations governing trade transac-
tions, creating more confusion. 
Gilmore, supra note 1, at 412; “There is much more variation across [rule of 
origin] regimes in the Americas.”  Estevadeordal & Suominen, supra note 18, 
at 11. 
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protective measures woven into them as a result of lobbying 
from critical industries pressuring their governments to protect 
their economic interests.192  These special interest measures 
  
 192. Silveira, supra note 182, at 461.  This “capturing” of domestic trade 
policies by special interest groups has been explored extensively by other au-
thors.  See, e.g., Jeffery Atik, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: 
Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 451, 459 (2001) (“The 
traditional view of capture of domestic trade policy is that local producers 
engage the national political apparatus to erect protectionist barriers.  The 
more recent view is that multinationals…have become dominant in national 
trade policy-making.”); Jeri Jensen-Moran, Trade Battles as Investment Wars: 
The Coming Rules of Origin Debate, 19 WASH. Q. 239 (1996) (“NAFTA clearly 
demonstrated how rules of origin can become a ‘viper’s nest for special inter-
ests,’ in the context of regional agreements.”); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legal-
ism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Or-
ganization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 836 (1995) (describing one model of WTO trade 
law as a regime in which private actors seek to influence national trade policy 
only for the benefit of their own personal interests); Linda C. Reif, Multidisci-
plinary Perspectives on the Improvement of International Environmental Law 
and Institutions, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 723, 738 (1994) (discussing Anne-Marie 
Slaughter Burley’s articulation of liberal internationalism, which “holds that 
private actors are the essential players in international society who, in seek-
ing to promote their own interests, influence the national policies of States”); 
Chantell Taylor, NAFTA, GATT, and the Current Free Trade System: A Dan-
gerous Double Standard for Workers’ Rights, 28 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 401, 
401 (2000) (arguing that “[t]he single, clearest, most direct result of economic 
globalization to date is a massive global transfer of economic and political 
power away from national governments and into the hands of global corpora-
tions and the trade bureaucracies they helped create”); Richard Bernal, Re-
gional Trade Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere, 8 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 683, 697 (1993) (noting the past “propensity [of the United States] to 
‘manage’ trade by resorting to protectionism for selected endangered indus-
tries”); Jared L. Landaw, Note, Textile and Apparel Trade Liberalization:  The 
Need for a Strategic Change in Free Trade Arguments, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 205, 217 (describing the role of textile and apparel industry lobbying in 
trade policies that provided them with protection from imports and concluding 
that “[t]rade policy is formulated in the legislative arena, where politicians 
are influenced by interest group lobbying.”); Joseph A. LaNasa III, Rules of 
Origin Under the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Substantial 
Transformation into Objectively Transparent Protectionism, 34 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 381, 400 (1993) (describing the U.S. automobile industry’s influence in the 
drafting of NAFTA’s unique rules of origin for automobiles, which seek to 
protect the U.S. industry); Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity 
Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1767, 1780 (2001) (noting that protectionist strategies 
influenced the AFL-CIO’s policy positions on the NAFTA); Michael P. Leidy & 
Bernard M. Hoekman, Spurious Injury as Indirect Rent Seeking:  Free Trade 
Under the Prospect of Protection, 3 ECON. & POL. 111, 112 & 116–17 (1991) 
(describing how labor and industry lobbies affect state policies on free trade 
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make later harmonization very difficult if not impossible be-
cause industries may have changed their entire mode of doing 
business as a result of these anomalies.193  Even slight devia-
tions could seriously injure the particular economic sector.194  In 
addition, the economic health of the participating nations may 
be closely tied to the particular industry, further complicating 
any attempt at harmonization.  Any change to rules of origin 
developed under such circumstances seems unlikely.195  In fact, 
the U.S. automobile industry will seek to include within any 
subsequent FTAA a level of origination even higher than the 
62.5% set by NAFTA.196  The U.S. automobile industry seeks 
such protection from the large and competitive market for 
  
particularly when it comes to providing protection from foreign competitors).  
Most recently, Bush Administration efforts to achieve rapid progress on free 
trade agreements with Central America and Australia have encountered re-
sistance  from “[t]he sugar industry -- which accounts for less than 1% of all 
U.S. farm sales but 17% of agriculture’s political contributions since 1990.”  
Michael Schroeder, Sugar Growers Hold Up Push for Free Trade, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 3, 2004, at A13.  U.S. manufacturers that stand to benefit most from 
these two pacts “have lined up on the other side” with one manufacturer’s 
lobbyist expressing concern that such agreements might “be hijacked by a few 
protectionist interests, which frankly are unwilling to compete.”  Id. (quoting 
William Lane, a Washington lobbyist for Caterpillar Inc., the Peoria, Ill. 
maker of construction and mining equipment). 
 193. Silveira, supra note 182, at 461. 
 194. CUSTOMS PROCEDURES AND RULES OF ORIGIN, supra note 11, at 4. 
 195. See Silveira, supra note 182, at 458 (noting that trade agreements tend 
to “reflect the position of the most powerful industries” giving rise to “an end-
less series of debates, and uneasiness in the negotiations”).  See also id. at 435 
(noting that international trade agreements sometimes establish special rules 
for particularly sensitive products); O’Hop, supra note 8, at 154 (explaining 
that existing subregional trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere were 
“designed to achieve specific economic objectives and to address almost exclu-
sively the particular needs of its subregional constituency” and that a regional 
agreement like the FTAA would have to bring harmony to conflicting institu-
tional and legal obstacles created by such self-serving agreements). 
NAFTA certainly is not going to relinquish its “rules of origin” on 
which receiving internal tariff preferences absolutely depends.  On 
the other hand, acceptance of NAFTA’s regime would detrimentally 
affect the MERCOSUR countries which might find themselves forced 
to switch their input sourcing from cheaper and higher quality 
sources in Europe and Asia, for example, in favor of North America in 
order to comply with the new rule-of-origin requirements. 
McClintock, supra note 2, at 47–48 (internal citations omitted). 
 196. Silveira, supra note 182, at 458. 
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automobile parts in Brazil.197  Many similar special interest re-
quests are likely to emerge from each of the remaining thirty-
three Partner Nations.  Such a state of affairs can only lead to 
endless debate and a negotiation process filled with great frus-
tration and little progress.198 
The special interest arguments expected to arise could be re-
solved more easily if any of the existing regional trade agree-
ments within the Western Hemisphere had a supranational 
institutional structure like that found within the EU.  Among 
other things, the fifteen-member EU trading bloc has created a 
common political structure that helps to identify and serve EU 
  
 197. Id. at 458.  See also Jeri Jensen-Moran, supra note 192, at  239 (“the 
automobile industry has already hinted it will want a rule even higher than 
62.5 percent when negotiations begin with Mercosur, because the Brazilian 
market is much bigger and…a competitive supplier of automobile parts”).   
 198. The impact of interest group politics in multilateral trade negotiations 
can be seen in the breakdown of the WTO Doha Round of talks held in 
Cancún, Mexico in September, 2003.  A major reason for the failure of these 
talks was the reluctance of developed nations like the United States and 
members of the European Union to agree to steep reductions in farm subsi-
dies, which developing countries blame for depressing world-wide prices and 
in turn locking their farmers out of the global market place.  Neil King, Jr. & 
Scott Miller, Trade Talks Fail Amid Big Divide Over Farm Issues, Developing 
Countries Object to U.S., EU Goals; Cotton as a Rallying Cry, WALL ST. J., 
Sept 15, 2003, at A1. 
Before the talks broke off, American farmer groups attending the con-
ference here said they were pleased [Robert B. Zoellick, the United 
States Trade Representative] was able to protect most of the farm bill 
passed in 2002, which raised subsidies by $40 billion…The farm 
states voted heavily in favor of Mr. Bush in the 2000 election, and 
were the backbone of the states that gave him the bulk of his elec-
toral votes.  Agribusiness, which profits from the low cost of corn, 
soybeans and other crops subsidized by American taxpayers, has 
shifted its allegiance to the Republican Party.  Political contributions 
from agribusiness jumped to $53 million in 2002 from $37 million in 
1992, with the Republicans’ share rising to 72 percent from 56 per-
cent, according to figures compiled by the Center for Responsive Poli-
tics. 
Elizabeth Becker, Coming U.S. Vote Figures in Walkout at Trade Talks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A6.  “All the lobbying pressures — business and so-
cial — are sowing a new skepticism toward international agreements among 
developing nations…all these extraneous nontrade issues are being brought in 
by newer and newer business lobbies, [and] people in developing countries are 
beginning to feel crowded.”  William Greider, The Real Cancún, WTO Heads 
Nowhere, NATION, Sept. 22, 2003, at 11, 13. 
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interests over those of each individual member.199  Unfortu-
nately, none of the existing trade agreements in the Western 
Hemisphere has such an institutional structure that can resolve 
the disputes that will certainly arise as the Partner Nations 
seek to find common ground upon which to build an FTAA.200 
Even if the Partner Nations can develop workable rules of 
origin, implementing these rules would pose yet another prob-
lem due to the diverse legal systems that exist throughout the 
Western Hemisphere.  The legal systems of the majority of na-
tions in the Western Hemisphere are based on civil law201 which 
resolves legal problems based on philosophical foundations 
quite different from common law nations like the United States 
and Canada.202  These different approaches to the law can lead 
to very different interpretations or applications of the same rule 
of origin.203  This was not a difficult obstacle for NAFTA negotia-
tors to overcome, but the problems easily could multiply as the 
FTAA adds thirty-one additional partners to the mix.  At the 
very least, it is a problem that must be anticipated and for 
which solutions should be explored. 
Finally, and most importantly, there exists a simple problem 
of incompatibility between existing regional trade agreements.  
The two largest regional trade agreements in the Western 
Hemisphere are NAFTA and MERCOSUR.204  While NAFTA is a 
  
 199. LEE E. PRESTON & DUANE WINDSOR, THE RULES OF THE GAME IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 97–98 (2d ed. 1997). 
 200. See O’Hop, supra note 8, at 159–61. 
 201. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 
5 (1994). 
 202. Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443, 
448 (1975). 
 203. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
TRADITIONS 16 (2d ed. 1994) (suggesting that interpretation and application of 
the law can lead to different outcomes based upon more than just legal his-
tory, but upon other factors such as the culture that creates the law, the lan-
guage that expresses it and the approach from which it is addressed).  O’Hop, 
supra note 8, at 163–64 (“Even among the civil law states, there is consider-
able diversity in the origin and content of their respective civil codes.  This 
diversity is further reflected in the manner in which the harmonization of 
laws agreed to pursuant to international conventions becomes effective under 
domestic law.”). 
 204. Bruner, supra note 7, at 28.  MERCOSUR is the common market for 
the Southern Cone established between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
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free trade agreement, which allows each of its members to    
establish their own unique tariffs for imported goods, 
MERCOSUR is a customs union, the defining characteristic of 
which is an agreement by all members to charge identical tar-
iffs for each imported good.205  Of the two forms of regional trade 
agreement, the customs union is much more difficult to achieve 
because of the political and special interest obstacles the mem-
ber nations must overcome to coordinate a single common ex-
ternal tariff on all products entering the territory encompassed 
by the customs union.206  NAFTA and MERCOSUR cannot be 
merged without changing the essential characteristics that 
make each agreement unique — characteristics that were pre-
sumably quite important in the negotiation process that pro-
duced each agreement.  NAFTA could seek to become a customs 
union like MERCOSUR and establish a common external tar-
iff,207 but GATT rules would require Mexico and Canada to lower 
their import duties to the lower amount already in place in the 
United States. 208  Canada and Mexico might, of course, be reluc-
tant to do so, but the greater problem is that the same GATT 
rule would oblige all members of any union between NAFTA 
and MERCOSUR similarly to lower external tariff rates to the 
3.5% established by the United States.209  Except for computers 
and telecommunications equipment, MERCOSUR has estab-
  
Uruguay.  The common market provides for the free movement of goods, ser-
vices and factors of production between the member nations.  Additionally, a 
common external tariff is adopted and macroeconomic policies are coordi-
nated.  See generally Treaty of Asuncion, Southern Common Market Agree-
ment (“MERCOSUR”), Mar. 26, 1991, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/ 
trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp. 
 205. Bruner, supra note 7, at 28; Gantz, supra note 16, at 402. 
 206. See Gantz, supra note 16, at 402 (internal citations omitted). 
 207. A customs union like MERCOSUR would still make use of rules of 
origin although to a much more limited extent than a free trade area, so a 
merger between NAFTA and MERCOSUR would still not resolve the problem 
inherent in agreeing upon a common set of rules.  Silveira, supra note 182, at 
421–22, 430, 453. 
 208. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 
XXIV(2)(b), 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.  GATT Article XXIV(5)(b), provides 
that whenever a regional trade agreement like a customs union is formed, the 
“duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constitu-
ent territories…shall not be higher or more restrictive” than those existing 
prior to formation of the customs union.  Id. 
 209. McClintock, supra note 2, at 47 (internal citations omitted). 
File: RamirezMacro3.22.04.doc Created on: 3/22/2004 2:25 PM Last Printed: 4/8/2004 1:36 PM 
2004] RULES OF ORIGIN 659 
lished a common external tariff of 20% for all foreign imports.210  
Due to its economic impact, it is highly doubtful that members 
of MERCOSUR would agree to lower their existing common 
external tariff by 16.5%. 
Given the incredible number of problems involved in negotiat-
ing an FTAA, it is not surprising that the Bush Administration, 
upon receiving Trade Promotion Authority, embarked on a race 
to negotiate as many free trade agreements as possible within a 
short period of time.211  The haste with which the Bush Admini-
stration has initiated negotiating additional free trade pacts is, 
perhaps, an indication of the lack of confidence that it has with 
the FTAA process.  It is also an indication that the Administra-
tion has not abandoned the “hub-and-spoke” strategy of estab-
lishing NAFTA–like rules as the hub of any free trade pact it 
negotiates.212  Establishing as many trade agreements as possi-
ble with smaller segments of Latin America seems to be the 
only viable alternative for the United States both because the 
NAFTA rules of origin pose too great an obstacle to forging a 
viable FTAA, and because achieving a customs union encom-
passing the entire Western Hemisphere would be politically 
impossible.213 
  
 210. Id. at 46–47. 
 211. As mentioned earlier, the Administration signed agreements with 
Chile, Singapore and Central America soon after having received authority, 
and it is currently negotiating or contemplating additional negotiations for 
similar free-trade agreements with the Dominican Republic, Morocco, Austra-
lia, Morocco, Panama, Bahrain, Thailand, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador 
and five Southern African Customs Union countries, which include Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.  Trade Scene: No Bore in 
2004, supra note 85.  These, of course, are in addition to existing free trade 
agreements with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA), and Israel and Jordon.  “The 
U.S. is now trying to hammer out free-trade deals with 14 countries….And as 
the [September, 2003 WTO Doha Round of talks in Cancún] broke down here, 
U.S. officials said that still more countries stepped forward to ask for bilateral 
trade deals.”  Cancún: Victory for Whom?, supra note 187, at A4. 
 212. FEINBERG, supra note 78, at 45 (1997).  Some observers have referred to 
this strategy as “a virtual FTAA.”  Kristi Ellis, Ambitious Agenda for FTAA, 
WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, Feb. 11, 2003 (quoting Professor Peter Morici at the 
University of Maryland School of Business for the proposition that the U.S. 
will continue to negotiate small trade agreements until they “finally get a 
virtual FTAA”). 
 213. The failure of the WTO Doha Round of talks held in Cancún, Mexico in 
September 2003, foreshadows the difficulties that will be faced by FTAA sup-
porters, and perhaps the ultimate fate of the FTAA itself will be abandonment 
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CONCLUSION 
Negotiating and implementing rules and procedures for 
tracking the importation and exportation of products through-
out the entire Western Hemisphere will not be an easy task.  If 
the FTAA is ever to have a chance to succeed, not only must the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere overcome the obstacles of 
history, language and culture, but they also must dismantle 
and reconstruct institutional bureaucracies at the domestic 
level that, in part, have cemented existing rules and proce-
dures.  This latter challenge may very well be the greater of the 
two for the Partner Nations.  Existing rules of origin, whether 
they are part of the NAFTA regime or belong to the more than 
two dozen other trade agreements already at work in the 
Americas, are not rules to be dismissed easily.  These rules 
have been worked and reworked to achieve certain political and 
economic goals at both the domestic and international level.  
Surely, each of the hundreds, if not thousands, of provisions 
found within each of these agreements that may strike us as 
idiosyncratic or irrelevant has been forged by a very deliberate 
negotiation process involving great compromise and exhaustive 
political wrangling both at home and abroad.  Any attempt at 
revising this complex set of relationships in order to integrate 
them into a larger and more complex hemispheric trade agree-
ment will require greater political skill and greater compromise 
than the American nations have ever shared with one another. 
Since the implementation of NAFTA in 1994, U.S. admini-
strations have continued to pursue a hub-and-spoke strategy to 
spread NAFTA–like rules throughout the Hemisphere.  How-
  
in favor of less complicated bilateral and regional trade agreements.  The 
breakdown of talks in Cancún has even caused the Europeans, quintessential 
multilateralists, to reconsider their focus and ask whether pursuit of bilateral 
trade accords might now be in their best interest.  Although the European 
Union is a party to several bilateral and regional trade pacts, it has not nego-
tiated any such agreements since 1999, preferring to pursue a multilateral 
strategy through the WTO.  Scott Miller, Bilateral Deals on Trade Draw Op-
position in EU, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2003, at A14.  See also Victory for 
Whom?, supra note 187, at A4 (“The EU held off on new bilateral trade deals 
until the Doha round was completed, putting all its trade chips in the WTO 
process.”).  Not to be left out, China and Japan also continue to pursue trade 
agreements with smaller blocs of neighbors, adding to the evidence of a world-
wide crisis of confidence in the ability of a large number of states to hammer 
out multilateral trade agreements.  Id. 
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ever, the eight-year absence of fast track authority, now re-
ferred to as Trade Promotion Authority, made extending 
NAFTA via hub-and-spoke difficult, if not impossible, because 
during the eight year hiatus, Latin American countries estab-
lished an ever more complex set of trading relationships among 
themselves and among other nations and trading blocs around 
the world.214  Although the nations of the Western Hemisphere 
still desire access to the rich markets of the United States, the 
United States may no longer possess the leverage to dictate the 
terms of such access.  The United States is realizing this as it 
proceeds with the FTAA negotiation process.  Its reaction has 
been to pursue a parallel process of negotiating agreements 
with individual Latin American countries215 to achieve through 
bilateral negotiations what it ultimately may not be able to 
achieve through multilateral negotiations. 
The United States cannot have it both ways.  It cannot seek 
hemispheric unity on the one hand, and on the other hand, a 
series of separate trade deals that only continue the balkaniza-
tion of trade relationships within the region.  It may be able to 
convince smaller segments of the Western Hemisphere to deal 
with it on it’s NAFTA–like terms, but in the end it would only 
establish another layer of complexity over the already intricate 
set of trading relationships that exist throughout the Western 
Hemisphere.   
  
 214. For a brief discussion on the various trade pacts among Latin Ameri-
can states, see Curtiss & Atkinson, supra note 16, at 148. 
 215. See, e.g., Cancun: Victory for Whom?, supra note 187 (stating the “U.S. 
is now trying to hammer out free-trade deals with 14 countries”).  See also 
Elizabeth Becker & Larry Rohter, supra note 83 (discussing the trade pact 
between the U.S. and Chile); Patrick Courreges, supra note 85 (discussing 
CAFTA whose partners include Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador 
and Guatemala).  Trade Scene: No Bore in 2004, supra note 85 (noting that 
the Bush Administration is currently negotiating or contemplating free-trade 
agreements with the Dominican Republic, Australia, Morocco, Panama, Bah-
rain, Thailand, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and the five Southern Africa 
Customs Union countries, which include Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South 
Africa and Swaziland). 
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The nations of the Western Hemisphere, including the United 
States, will achieve truly free trade only when they compromise 
their established concepts of trade, and this may include aban-
doning ties to specific provisions found within existing rules of 
origin.  The thirty-four democracies of the Americas must agree 
to negotiate creatively and openly with each other if they are to 
make each other stronger.  One can only hope that the nations 
eventually will reach this level of cooperation and trust as the 
FTAA negotiations proceed. 
 
